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INTRODUCTION

The sixth amendment assures several protections of the criminal
defendant, including the right of an accused 'to be confronted with
the witnesses against him.", This language is simple, yet its purpose
and application remain obscure. This article discusses the Supreme
Court's theory of the confrontation clause, critiques that theory, and
suggests an alternative.
*Iam indebted to the following people for helpful criticisms of the ideas in this article:
Jacquelyn Fox-Good, B. Glenn George, Stanley Ingber, Jerry Leavitt, Gene Nichol, Jr., Joan
Shaughnessy, Walter Weyrauch, and the criminal law colloquium participants at the Johann
Wolfgang Goethe Universitdt in Frankfurt, West Germany.
Melissa Anderson provided able research assistance, and I thank her.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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In most of its recent decisions, 2 as in its earlier cases, 3 the Court
has interpreted the accused's right to confrontation as primarily a
guarantee of the opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses.4 The
Court views cross-examination as a vehicle for uncovering falsehoods
and for testing witness credibility. Consequently, it has identified
"evidence reliability" as the central value of the confrontation clause. 5
Extending this rationale, the Court has approved exceptions to
the confrontation requirement whenever out-of-court, nonconfronted

2. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987); Kentucky v. Stincer, 107
S. Ct. 2658 (1987); Cruz v. New York, 107 S. Ct. 1714 (1987); Richardson v. Marsh, 107 S. Ct.
1702 (1987); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986);
United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986); see also Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation
Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557 (1988) (critiquing the Court's postRoberts cases for misinterpreting the mission of the confrontation clause as reliability, rather
than as a guarantee of an adversarial criminal proceeding).
3. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972);
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Barber v. Page,
390 U.S. 719 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965).
Several commentators have canvassed and critiqued these earlier Supreme Court confrontation clause cases and have devised their own compatible, or alternative, theories about the
clause and its proper application. See, e.g., Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay
Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99 (1972) [hereinafter Sir
Walter Raleigh]; Graham, The Confrontation Clause, The Hearsay Rule and the Forgetful
Witness, 56 TEx. L. REV. 151 (1978) [hereinafter Forgetful Witness]; Kirkpatrick, Confrontation
and Hearsay: Exemptions From the Constitutional UnavailabilityRequirement, 70 MIN. L.
REV. 665 (1986); Read, The New Confrontation- Hearsay Dilemma, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(1972); Seidelson, Hearsay Exceptions and the Sixth Amendment, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 76
(1971); Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for
Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525 (1978) [hereinafter Unified Theory]; Westen, The
Future of Confrontation, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1185 (1979) [hereinafter Future of Confrontation];
Younger, Confrontation and Hearsay: A Look Backward, A Peek Forward, 1 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 31, 32 (1973); Note, Reconciling the Conflict Between the Co-conspiratorExemption From
the Hearsay Rule and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1291, 1294 (1985); Comment, Preserving the Right to Confrontation - A New Approach to
Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1965).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 69-70.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 39-43. Not all commentators agree with the Court's
view. See, e.g., Forgetful Witness, supra note 3, at 192 (advocating a rule that only excludes
hearsay when the witness is available and the prior statement was accusatory when made);
Future of Confrontation, supra note 3, at 599-600 (eschewing reliance on "reliability" in favor
of a requirement that the prosecution make a good faith effort to produce a witness, unless the
out-of-court statement is such that the defendant reasonably could not be expected to wish to
examine the witness in person); Comment, Confrontation, Cross Examination, and the Right
to Preparea Defense, 56 GEo. L.J. 939, 940 (1968) (noting that the right incorporates an element
of fairness independent of reliability concerns).
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evidence is sufficiently 'trustworthy."6 The justices often disagree
about what kind of evidence meets their reliability standard, but until
1988 the current justices seemed to concur that evidence reliability is
the touchstone to modern confrontation clause analysis. The Court has
applied this standard to afford narrow confrontation clause protection
for criminal defendants, which serves - not accidentally - the interests of prosecutorial efficiency and state autonomy.
The problem with this interpretation of the confrontation guarantee
became apparent when the Court's theory began to be applied to
modern, nontraditional uses of out-of-court testimony against a criminal defendant, such as the use of closed-circuit television testimony,
or testimony given behind screens or one-way mirrors by child victims
of sexual assault.7 Under the reliability theory, neither closed-circuit
testimony nor screened witness testimony offends the sixth amendment, because this testimony satisfies the Court's standards for reliability. Yet many people, including some members of the Court,8 sense
that these devices may compromise the criminal defendant's right to
confront his or her accusers, 9 despite any reliability of this testimony
and despite the strong societal interest in protecting children and
prosecuting child molesters.

6. See infra text accompanying notes 42-43.
7. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. § 92.54 (Supp.
1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (Burns Supp. 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350
(Baldwin Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (West Supp. 1987); MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:84A-32.4 (West Supp. 1986);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 753 (Supp. 1986); TEx. CRlM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.071 (Vernon
Supp. 1986); see also Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273
(1984); Herbert v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1981); Coy v.
Iowa, 397 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1987), reversed, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988); Craig v. Maryland, 76 Md.
App. 250, 544 A.2d 784 (1988); Wildermuth v. Maryland, 310 Md. 496, 530 A.2d 275 (1987);
State v. Warford, 223 Neb. 368, 389 N.W.2d 575 (1986); State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super.
411, 484 A.2d 1330 (Law Div. 1984); Pennsylvania v. Ludwig, 366 Pa. Super. 361, 531 A.2d
459 (1987); State v. Tafoya, 105 N.M. 117, 729 P.2d 1371 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, Tafoya v.
State, 105 N.M. 94, 728 P.2d 845 (N.M. 1986), vacated, Tafoya v. New Mexico, 108 S. Ct. 2890,
on remand, State v. Tafoya, No. 9004 (N.M. App. Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, NM-CS
database), cert. denied, No. 18,034 (N.M. Nov. 18, 1988) (WESTLAW, IC database); Berryhill
v. Texas, 56 U.S.L.W. 3079 (Tex. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 10-9-85), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1012
(1988); see generally Cares, Videotaped Testimony of Child Victims, 65 MICH. B.J. 46 (1986);
Note, The Use of Closed-CircuitTelevision Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases:A Twentieth
Solution to a Twentieth Century Problem, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 919 (1986); Note, Closed-Circuit Television Testimony for the Sexually Abused Child: The Right to Avoid Confrontation?,
27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 117 (1987); Comment, Television Trials and FundamentalFairness:
The Constitutionalityof Louisiana's Child Shield Law, 61 TUL. L. REV. 141 (1986).
8. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 167-70.
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The Court's reliability theory also jars some persons' sense of fairness when it is applied to traditional uses of hearsay testimony. For
example, the government can introduce an incriminating out-of-court
statement of a defendant's alleged co-conspirator without producing
that accuser in court. 10 However, the government's failure to produce
the co-conspirator, or at least to account for his or her absence, may
cause people to question prosecutorial integrity and to doubt whether
the defendant has been given a fair hearing.
In this article, I propose a theory of the confrontation guarantee
that corresponds with common notions of fairness to the accused. The
first section reviews the history and language of the confrontation
clause, from which a preliminary definition of the guarantee is extracted.1" The next section analyzes the Supreme Court's recent confrontation clause decisions. The discussion shows that the Court's past
statement that reliability is the central value of confrontation has led
the Court to ask the wrong questions, and, on occasion, to give the
wrong answers in its confrontation clause decisions. Missing from the
reliability calculus is a consideration of the value of face-to-face confrontation beyond assuring evidence reliability. As the Court's most recent
confrontation clause decision shows, 2 even reliable out-of-court testimony against the accused may offend the Constitution. The right of
confrontation also promotes an intrinsic, nonfunctional interest: to preserve the dignity of the criminal defendant. 13
14
Borrowing from related writings about the due process clause, I
propose a theory of the confrontation clause that rests on principles
of human dignity. This approach to the confrontation guarantee should
provide a theoretical basis for the confrontation clause that accounts
for both the instrumental and intrinsic values of a face-to-face encounter. Its application would not hamstring evidence law reform efforts, or unreasonably restrict prosecutorial efforts to enforce the criminal code. But the dignity theory neither begins with these concerns
nor is premised on deference to these policy interests.
Finally, I apply the dignity theory to common confrontation clause
problems.' 5 This discussion shows that the dignity theory provides

10. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987); United States v. Inadi,
475 U.S. 387 (1986).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 16-36.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 109-19.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 125-51.
14. See infra note 126.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 152-70.
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both more and less constitutional protection for criminal defendants
than the reliability theory affords. The application of the theory should
conform to our intuition about proper, or fair, criminal prosecutions.
II.

INTENT OF THE FRAMERS

A beginning point in analysis of a constitutional provision is its
history. To the extent that the framers' intent is clear, it is the
framework for modern constitutional issues. Although the history of
the confrontation guarantee is sparse and ambiguous, 16 it does offer
preliminary insight into the intended scope and application of the
clause.
Apparently, the confrontation clause was included without debate
along with the other rights guaranteed by the sixth amendment. 17
Some historians believe that abuses during the English trial of Sir
Walter Raleigh were the genesis of the sixth amendment confrontation
right.18 Other writers cite older sources, including scripture 9 and
Shakespeare, 20 as evidence that confrontation was perceived to be one
element of a fair hearing long before Sir Raleigh's trial. 21 Most writers
conclude that a main purpose of the confrontation guarantee was to
give the accused an opportunity to test a witness's credibility and

16. See Sir Walter Raleigh, supra note 3, at 103-04; Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation:
Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PuB. L. 381 (1959); Read, supra note 3, at 4-6.
17. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 176 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). On the basis
of his reading of history, Justice Harlan concludes as follows: "If anything, the confrontation
guarantee may be thought, along with the right to compulsory process, merely to constitutionalize
the right to a defense as we know it." Id.
18.

See, e.g., F. HELLER, THE SIxTH AMENDMENT 104 (1951).

19. Acts 25:14-16.
20. W. SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II, Act I, Scene 1. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798,
2800 (1988).
21. See, e.g., Pollitt, supra note 16, at 384. Pollitt notes that the right of confrontation is
based on an enduring assumption that confrontation is the best way to determine the truth. He
observes:
The right to confrontation comes to the fore when the protection of individual
liberty is thought to clash with the demands of national security. However, this
problem is not peculiar to the mid-twentieth century. The problem existed over
2,000 years ago when the Roman Emperor Trajan advised his Governor that "anonymous accusations must not be admitted in evidence" against "a new sect known
as Christian." The problem existed in seventeenth-century England and resolved
in favor of the religious-political heretic. The problem existed in eighteenth-century
America, and those who founded our nation wrote the right to confrontation into
the Bill of Rights of our Constitution.
Id. at 413.
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accuracy through cross-examination.2 " The particular evil the clause

is thought to protect against is 'trial by affidavit,"2 that is, trial by
hearsay.
One commentator has observed that the notion that an accused
should be entitled to confront his or her accusers was widely recognized
in the American colonies during the early eighteenth century.Y
Nevertheless, the colonists believed it was necessary to expressly
name this right in the Constitution because of their experiences with
procedures in English trade and navigation cases during the 1700s.
These trials often were held in England without a jury, were instituted
by secret informants, and permitted adverse evidence to be presented
by deposition or in private meetings with the judge.?
This scant history of the confrontation clause shows that the clause
is satisfied by face-to-face confrontation between the accuser and de-

fendant, testimony under oath, and an opportunity for cross-examination. However, the interpretation dilemma lies not in deciding whether
these conditions satisfy the sixth amendment, but whether departures
from them are constitutional, and if so, under what circumstances.
That is, can hearsay accusations ever be introduced in a criminal trial?
History suggests that the colonists condoned the admission of some

accusations against a defendant without confrontation. Under common

22. See supra note 3. Wigmore perceived the hearsay rule and the confrontation guarantee
as coextensive, because they both protect the value of cross-examination. 5 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1397, at 158-62 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974). Thus, under his view, the confrontation
clause merely constitutionalizes the hearsay rule and its exceptions, as they may evolve.
Morgan viewed the right to cross-examination as an "essential element of an adversary
system," and linked the development of the hearsay rule and its exceptions to the development
of the adversary process. Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusion Rules of Evidence, 4 U. CHI.
L. REV. 247, 255 (1936-37). He observed that this adversary theory often is ignored in discussions
about why certain exceptions to the hearsay rule exist, in favor of arguments that a circumstance
offers other indicia of trustworthiness. Id. at 256. Morgan argues that this often '"means nothing
more than that an ordinary man in the situation of the declarant would have desired to tell the
truth, and, sometimes, merely that he would have had no motive to falsify." Id. He adds that
other exceptions are not based on 'trustworthiness" at all, but on necessity, because "hearsay
is better than no evidence." Id.; see also Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the
Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L. REV. 177, 181-82 (1948); accord Jonakait, supra note 2.
Morgan's discussion of theories about the hearsay rule and its exceptions could easily be a
discussion of current theories about the confrontation clause. His observations are especially
pertinent to the Court's recent decision affording constitutional status to the 'Tirmly-rooted"
hearsay exceptions. See infra text accompanying notes 54-67.
23. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156-57 (1970); Mattox v. United States,
156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
24. Pollitt, supra note 16, at 395.
25. Id. at 397-400.
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law, certain hearsay, such as the dying declaration, was admissible
against an accused.2 This long-standing practice, which the Supreme
Court has deemed constitutional,27 suggests that the right to confrontation is qualified by the availability of the hearsay declarant for incourt testimony.28
Noting that exceptions to the rule against hearsay existed at common law, the Court has concluded that "firmly-rooted" exceptions to
the hearsay rule do not offend the confrontation clause.2 Presumably,
these "firmly-rooted" exceptions at least include the exceptions that
existed at common law before 1787. Thus, history remains a useful
guide to the current Court's analysis of some confrontation clause
problems. Less clear is whether newer exceptions to state and federal
hearsay rules can be added to the original common law list without
offending the sixth amendment. The incantations that confrontation
was meant to "assure cross-examination" or to "prevent trial by affidavit" do little to resolve whether, for example, the prosecution
today should be permitted to offer videotaped testimony of a child
victim of sexual assault. 30 To answer these emerging questions about
modern confrontation clause dilemmas requires more than a glance at
the available history.

III. THE "PLAIN MEANING" OF THE CLAUSE
A second guide to sixth amendment interpretation is the specific
wording of the provision and its surrounding text. The general language of the confrontation clause, like its history, affords only limited

26. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 237.
27. Id.
28. See Green, 399 U.S. at 178 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also, Read, supra note 3, at
5. Sir William Holdsworth states that after 1640 the nature of criminal proceedings in England
became more humane. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 229-31 (1938). One
of the features of this "humaner practice" was that '"the accused person had the witnesses
against him produced face to face, unless there was some special reason (such as sickness) to
justify the reading of their depositions ....
The prisoner also was allowed, not only to
cross-examine the witnesses against him if he thought fit, but also to call witnesses of his own."'
Id. at 230 (emphasis added) (quoting H. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 358 (1824)).
Holdsworth further notes that "as the objections to hearsay gathered weight [throughout the
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries], it began to be thought that these depositions [which
contained the main part of the prosecution's case] ought ornly to be read if the witness could
not be produced Raleigh was prepared to admit the legality of reading Cobham's deposition
if he could 'not be had conveniently."' Id. at 218 (emphasis added).
29. Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66
(1980).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 125-29.
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insight into how the clause should be applied in particular circumstances. Again, however, it does assist in defining the scope of
this guarantee.
The entire sixth amendment reads as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defencel1
This context reveals that confrontation of adverse witnesses is a companion right to trial by jury, notice of the accusation, compulsion of
appearance by witnesses on one's behalf, legal counsel, and a speedy
and public disposition. By itself, the confrontation clause does not
guarantee any of these other rights. Taken together, the sixth amendment bundle of rights, along with the protections of the fifth amendment, assures the accused the right to present "a defense as we know
it.,,n
The text of the confrontation clause places certain limits on its
application. The phrase "to be confronted with witnesses against him"
shows that the clause applies only to testimony by witnesses - that
is, people - and not to all forms of evidence offered against an accused.
Inclusion of the word "witnesses" implies that the confrontation clause
is not a sweeping constitutional mandate that applies to all evidence
against the criminal defendant. For example, the state may use forensic techniques that are unreliable and unfairly incriminating. Reliance
on this evidence would be improper and possibly unconstitutional, but
the relevant constitutional text for the accused to invoke would not
be the confrontation clause.
The phrase "witnesses against him" arguably suggests that the
clause was intended to cover only focused accusations against the

31. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
32. See Green, 399 U.S. at 176 (Harlan, J., concurring). Another summary of the sixth
amendment also describes well its overall impact: 'The Sixth Amendment guarantees that the
conviction of the accused will be the product of an adversarial process, rather than the ex parte
investigation and determination by the prosecutor." Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 453 (1984)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
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accused, and not all statements relevant to a crime. Only witnesses
who speak against the accused must confront the defendant. In other
words, only witnesses who make statements that are directed against
the defendant and that accuse him or her of wrongdoing must confront
the defendant.3 For example, if a liquor store is robbed and a neighbor
states two days later that she saw a bearded man rush out of the
store, she probably is not the type of witness against the accused to
which the confrontation clause refers. Her out-of-court statements
may be excluded under the state's applicable hearsay rules, and her
presence at trial might enable the defendant to show that she was
mistaken or lying or should not be believed for other reasons. But
this out-of-court statement is not the sort of focused accusation against
the accused that the confrontation clause probably was intended to
address. Thus, the confrontation clause is not a bar against the use
of all hearsay in a criminal trial. 4

33. Several commentators have interpreted the phrase "witnesses against him" to mean
something less than anyone who offers some information that is used against the defendant.
Professor Westen defines a witness against an accused as "any person who is available to testify
in person (or who, if unavailable, is unavailable through fault of the state) whose statements
the prosecution introduces into evidence against the accused and whom the prosecution can
reasonably expect the defendant to wish to cross-examine at that time." Westen, The Future
of Confrontation, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1185, 1206-07 (1979).
Professor Michael Graham limits a witness against the accused to persons who are available
for in-court testimony and whose out-of-court statements were accusatory when made. Forgetful
Witness, supra note 3, at 192-98. An "accusatory" statement, according to Graham, is one the
declarant knew or reasonably could have anticipated would assist the government in arresting
or prosecuting someone for a crime. Id. at 193-94.
Professor Baker argues that a witness against the accused is someone who is available for
in-court testimony and whose statements do not embrace "routine and collateral" matters. Baker,
The Right to Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules, and Due Process, 6 CONN. L. REV. 529, 545
(1974).
Professor Kenneth Graham concludes that whether one is a "witness against" the accused
may depend on whether the declarant's statements make that declarant a "principal witness"
for the prosecution. If the hearsay is necessary for the government to survive a motion for
acquittal, versus hearsay that is used merely as corroboration, then it does not violate the
confrontation clause. Sir Walter Raleigh, supra note 3, at 129-31.
The limited definition of a "witness against" an accused offered in this Article is compatible
with the definitions of Westen, Michael Graham, and Baker, and possibly with that of Kenneth
Graham. It is based on a different theory of confrontation, however, and so it may occasionally
lead to different results, of which these commentators might not approve.
34. No theory of the confrontation clause ever has required, nor likely ever will require,
exclusion of all hearsay evidence. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) ("[I~f thus applied,
the Clause would abrogate virtually every hearsay exception, a result long rejected as unintended
and too extreme.").
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A third limitation on the confrontation clause also may be drawn
from the word "witnesses." The term "witness" ordinarily is associated
with people who speak in a trial setting. Thus, witness statements
that the prosecuting authorities rely on in the pre-trial stage, but do
not use at trial, are not covered by the confrontation guarantee. Only
the accusatory statements that are repeated at the criminal trial, and
that may form the basis for a conviction, should trigger confrontation
clause analysis.
The remaining language of the clause states that the defendant
should be "confronted" by the accuser. The phrase "to be confronted"
has several implications. One is that the defendant and the accuser
should be brought together physically - the "face-to-face" aspect of
the guarantee. 5 Unlike a written statement, a physical encounter requires an accuser to make the accusation before the fact finder, and
in front of the accused. In short, the witness must look the accused
in the eye, and must be present for public observation by the judge
and jury. All of these conditions may chill the accuser's willingness
to make condemning remarks about the defendant. They also enable
the fact finder to view the witness's demeanor, which may affect its
assessment of the witness's credibility.
Beyond these static qualities, the phrase "to be confronted" also
suggests an opportunity for active interaction between accused and
accuser. Specifically, the term probably means that the defendant
should be allowed to question the accuser and to ask the witness to
defend or explain the accusation. Cross-examination, of course, is the
label ordinarily attached to this process of witness interrogation.
Therefore, the history and language of the confrontation clause
provide a rough outline of the guarantee. It is the right to confront
witnesses physically and to question those persons who accuse the
defendant of a crime, and whose focused accusations the prosecution
presents in the trial stage of the proceeding. Taken alone, this is not
a guarantee of a fair trial, of a trial based solely on testimony by live
witnesses who are present in the courtroom, or of a trial based only

35. In its most recent confrontation decision, the Court describes the derivation of the word
"confront" as follows:
Simply as a matter of Latin. . .the word "confront" ultimately derives from the
prefix "con-" (from "contra" meaning "against" or "opposed") and the noun "frons"
(forehead). Shakespeare was thus describing the root meaning of confrontation
when he had Richard the Second say: "Then call them to our presence - face to
face, and frowning brow to brow, ourselves will hear the accuser and the accused
freely speak."
Coy v. Iowa, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 2800 (1988).
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on dependable evidence. It is merely a guarantee of one aspect of a
fair trial: the right to "confront" one's human accusers. This limited
definition is consistent with the historical perspective that the naming
of the right occurred in response to trials by affidavit and to the gross
6
procedural abuses during Sir Walter Raleigh's trial.
Numerous questions remain unanswered by this very general definition. One question is whether the right is satisfied when the witness
is evasive, forgetful, or otherwise difficult to examine. For example,
a witness may appear, but refuse to testify or answer questions. If
"confrontation" includes interaction between accuser and accused, then
a witness's complete refusal or present inability to answer a defendant's question may render the out-of-court testimony inadmissible,
even though the witness is physically present. On the other hand, the
right to be confronted may only mean the right to force the witness
to appear and to ask the witness questions; it may not include a right
to receive answers. The fact finder can see that the witness will not,
or cannot, answer the defendant, and thus may be inclined to discredit
the witness.
Another question is whether the prosecution can use testimony of
a witness who has died or who cannot appear for other reasons. One
interpretation of the confrontation clause would be that "it means
what it says" and that the prosecution never should be allowed to use
testimony of an absent witness. As I have indicated, however, the
common law history of admitting dying declarations shows that statements by some absent witnesses probably should be permitted. Thus,
the questions become when and why these exceptions will be allowed.
Neither history nor the "plain meaning" of the clause responds
adequately to these questions. In these grey areas, interpreters necessarily will be guided by their theory about the core value of the
confrontation guarantee, and by their estimation of the importance of
that value vis-a-vis other policy concerns.
During the past twenty years, various justices have tried to devise
a theory of the confrontation clause that would guide these problems
of definition and application. The result is a confusing collection of
cases in which the Court struggles - with limited, often short-lived,

36. Sir Raleigh's accuser, Lord Cobham, confessed to acts of treason by himself and Raleigh.
Cobham later retracted his accusations against Raleigh. Cobhan's out-of-court accusation was
offered in the trial against Raleigh, despite Raleigh's protest that Cobham should be brought
before him. Cobham was available nearby, in prison. This demand was refused, and Raleigh
was convicted and ultimately executed for his alleged treason. See J. PHILLIMORE, HISTORY
AND PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 157 (1850).
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success - to develop a theory to reconcile the constitutional guarantee
of the right to confront one's accusers with the justices' estimations
of the demands of routine litigation.
IV.

THE COURT'S THEORY OF CONFRONTATION

Significant confrontation clause case law is a recent phenomenon;
the majority of the important Supreme Court decisions have been
decided since 1965. In 1965, the Warren Court held in Pointer v.
Texas37 that the confrontation guarantee applies to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. This development has increased substantially the number of cases in which the Court has encountered confrontation issues. Therefore, the Court's attempts to work out a theory
of the clause are relatively new, and appear tentative.
A second recent development, which also has influenced the Court's
approach to the confrontation clause, was the adoption of uniform
rules of evidence for federal courts. In 1972, the Supreme Court approved uniform rules of evidence, which were enacted in 1975. Many
states since have adopted similar or identical rules.
These two developments have made the Court chary of construing
the confrontation clause expansively, lest it undermine the uniform
rules or restrict state or federal efforts at future evidence law reform.
An expansive reading of the confrontation clause would force states
and the federal government to modify their evidence law in criminal
cases, especially with respect to hearsay, to satisfy the constitutional
requirement. The Court has been reluctant to do this, and so has
fashioned its constitutional theory to match the uniform rules. A broad
confrontation requirement also would make prosecution of criminal
cases more difficult. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts in particular
have been unwilling to impose constitutional requirements that hamper
prosecutorial efficiency or restrict states' autonomy. As the following
discussion will show, the most recent confrontation clause cases follow
this general pattern of deference to prosecutorial needs.

37. 380 U.S. 400 (1965). See Comment, Criminal Procedure - Sixth Amendment Right of
ConfrontationMade Obligatory in State Prosecutions,44 N.C.L. REV. 173, 179 (1965) (predicting that Pointerwould shift the Court's emphasis in confrontation cases to whether the exceptions
to the hearsay rules offend the sixth amendment).
38. In 1965, the Chief Justice appointed an advisory committee to draft a set of evidence
rules for the federal courts. The Supreme Court approved the final draft in 1972 to take effect
on July 1, 1973. Congress intervened and did not enact the rules into law until January 2, 1975.
The rules became effective on July 1, 1975.
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A.

The Roberts Two-Step Approach

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Court made its first
modern efforts to define the right to confrontation39 The cases link
cross-examination and confrontation, and suggest that evidence reliability is the purpose behind both. In 1980, the Burger Court described
its theory of the confrontation clause. In Ohio v. Roberts, 40 the Court
set forth a simple, two-step approach to confrontation problems. The
first step requires that the prosecution usually must either produce
the witness or demonstrate his or her unavailability4l before it may
use the out-of-court statement. This step is based on the Court's
conclusion that the confrontation clause establishes a preference for
face-to-face accusations.
The second step is based on the Court's assumption that the preference for live testimony enhances evidence reliability. It provides
that when a witness is unavailable, the witness's out-of-court statement
still may be admitted if it bears adequate indicia of reliability.4 This
reliability, the Court noted, "can be inferred without more in a case
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. ' 43
The Court in Roberts described the dual purpose of the confrontation guarantee as follows: to assure the personal presence and crossexamination of the witness. The values of personal presence and crossexamination are that the accused can test the accuracy of the witness's
statement, and the fact finder can view the witness's demeanor and
evaluate his or her credibility.- Weighed against these defendant-centered interests, the Court noted, is the state's "strong interest in
effective law enforcement, and in the development and precise formulation of the rules of evidence applicable in criminal proceedings.' ' 45

39. See, e.g., Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979); Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971);
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Illinois v. Allen,
397 U.S. 337 (1970); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 415 (1965). This Article is not designed to provide an exhaustive canvas of the pre-1980
case law on the confrontation clause. Much good scholarship already exists that performs this
task, and that should adequately guide lawyers and judges who seek to understand and apply
these holdings. See, e.g., Read, supra note 3.
40. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). The significant pre-Roberts confrontation cases were decided in
1970. In 1972, Justices Powell, Stevens and Rehnquist replaced Black, Douglas and Harlan,
respectively. This change in the Court has proven to be significant in the area of criminal
procedure.
41. 448 U.S. at 65.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 66.
44. Id. at 63-64.
45. Id. at 64.
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1. Unavailability of the Declarant
The Roberts two-step approach raised several questions. One question was whether its "unavailable-first" language meant that the prosecution always must either produce a witness or demonstrate the
witness's unavailability before it may offer the out-of-court statement
against the accused. Numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule that
appear in federal and state evidence laws permit the government to
introduce hearsay without regard to the declarant's availability. For
example, excited utterances, present sense impressions, and state of
mind declarations are admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence
even if the declarant could have been called into court to repeat the
declaration. 46 A strict reading of Roberts prohibits the prosecution
from using these declarations unless it produces the declarant or demonstrates that its good-faith efforts to secure the witness's presence
have failed.
Given the current Court's concern about preserving both prosecutorial discretion and the uniform rules of evidence, its later "clarification"
of Roberts seems inevitable. In 1986, the Court interpreted the "unavailable-first" language in Roberts to apply only to the type of hearsay
before the Court in that case - testimony given in a prior court
proceeding. 47 Despite the implication in Roberts that its two-step approach applied to all hearsay problems, the Court in United States v.
Inadi disavowed any intention to establish a general test and commented that "Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical
proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced by the
government without a showing that the declarant is unavailable."""
The Court in Inadi limited the "unavailable-first" language of
Roberts by stating that the prosecution need only demonstrate the
witness's unavailability when the hearsay is a "weaker substitute for
live testimony." 49 Prior court testimony, the justices stated, is a
weaker substitute for in-court testimony because the evidence "seldom
has independent evidentiary significance of its own, but is intended
to replace live testimony."o In contrast, the evidence at issue in Inadi,
statements of co-conspirators made in furtherance of the conspiracy,

46. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(3).
47. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
48. Id. at 394 (emphasis added). The Court cited a footnote in Ohio v. Roberts, wherein
the Court indicated that it intended to proceed on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 392 (citing Ohio
v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 n.9 (1980)).
49. Id.
50. Id.
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did possess independent evidentiary significance because conspirators
will "speak differently" to each other than they will on the witness
stand.5 1 These out-of-court statements therefore cannot be replicated.
Indeed, they derive their value from the fact that they were made in
a context different from a trial. In other words, the hearsay is "great
hearsay," and so is admissible even though the co-conspirator may be
available for in-court testimony.
The Court in Inadi also saw no benefit to an unavailability rule
for co-conspirator statements. The Court explained:
[I]f the declarant either is unavailable, or is available and
produced by the prosecution, the statements can be introduced anyway. Thus, the unavailability rule cannot be defended as a constitutional "better evidence" rule, because it
does not actually serve to exclude anything, unless the prosecution makes the mistake of not producing an otherwise
available witness 2
This argument is persuasive only if the central value of confrontation is to enhance evidence reliability. If the evidence will be admitted
"anyway," then the unavailability requirement does not improve evidence reliability and thus can be abandoned. The implication, however,
is that the prosecution never has a constitutional obligation to demonstrate the unavailability of a witness, because the exceptions to the
hearsay rules that require witness unavailability always "let the evidence in anyway" when unavailability can be established.
The Court's thinking raises at least three problems. First, the
prosecution's failure to secure a witness's presence may be based in
part on a sense that the absent witness would not - and perhaps

51. Id. at 395.
52. Id. at 396. This "better evidence" rationale has some support by commentators. The
Court cites Professor Kenneth Graham, who has stated that "the Sixth Amendment has overtones
of a constitutional best evidence rule; i.e., where confrontation is excused it expresses a preference for the use of methods of proving the extra-judicial statement that minimizes the dangers
in use of unconfronted evidence." Sir Walter Raleigh, supra note 3, at 143. The Court's cite to
Professor Graham, however, is somewhat misleading. Graham notes that the preference for the
better evidence operates when confrontation is excused. He does not say that this means that
whenever "better evidence" is available it can be used, regardless of whether the witness is
available.
There is a danger in describing the common features of the condoned "exceptions" to the
confrontation requirement and then using those features as a basis for justifying other exceptions.
This method tends to ignore that these same characteristics may appear in evidence that is not
excepted from the requirement. It also may highlight the wrong features of the excepted
evidence.
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should not - be believed under oath. The government may suspect
that the witness would not fare well under cross-examination and that
the testimony would be more believable if the jury never saw the
witness. This may be particularly true when the witness is a co-conspirator or "partner in crime." Thus, the requirement that the government must show the witness to be unavailable is potentially related
to evidence reliability. The superiority of in-court testimony might be
worth the attempt to compel the witness to appear. The fear that the
prosecution will hide "bad" witnesses, fabricate testimony, or make
no effort to produce a witness whose credibility is doubtful is what
led past justices to require that prosecutors make a "good-faith effort"
to produce declarants.-Second, the Court's analysis is based on an unconvincing assumption - that prior court testimony has no independent evidentiary
significance. The very fact that the prior testimony was given earlier
suggests that it possesses independent evidentiary value. Memories
fade, so that earlier statements may be more "reliable" than later
testimony. Also, as a practical matter, the witness's later testimony
often will represent the witness's recollection of this prior recorded
testimony, rather than a recall of the underlying events. Once told,
the story may congeal so that the freshest, most spontaneous account
will be the first one. In any event, determinations about whether a
category of out-of-court statements is "weaker" or "stronger" than
in-court testimony rest primarily on conjecture. The Court offers no
guidelines for lower courts to determine what hearsay, other than
co-conspirators' statements, has "independent evidentiary significance."
The final and most serious problem with the theory is its premise
that the sole value of the confrontation guarantee is to enhance reliability. As will be shown, confrontation has an intrinsic value, which
lends force to an unavailable-first requirement even when the hearsay
is "great hearsay," or would come in "anyway" if the witness were
unavailable.,
The best explanation for the result in Inadi probably is that the
Court was unwilling to disrupt the long-established practice of admitting hearsay that falls within certain categories without a prior showing of witness unavailability. Thus, the likely future impact of Inadi

53. See, e.g., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968) ("[A] witness is not 'unavailable'
for purposes of the [prior testimony) exception to the confrontation requirement unless the
prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial.").
54. See infra text accompanying notes 130-51.
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will be to give constitutional sanction to this past practice. To introduce
hearsay that falls into categories for which an unavailable-first showing
traditionally has been required - such as prior testimony, statement
against interest, or dying declaration - the government still will be
expected to use "good-faith" efforts to secure the declarant's presence.
But, the rationale the Court offers in Inadi does not require such a
limited effect. So we are left, at present, to wonder what role the
declarant's availability will play in future confrontation clause applications.
2. Firmly-Rooted Equals Reliability
A second question left open after Roberts was whether the reliability of hearsay that falls within a firmly-rooted exception really can be
inferred "without more." Some hearsay exceptions, such as the rule
that treats as "nonhearsay" statements made in furtherance and during
the course of a conspiracy,- admit very damaging out-of-court statements against an accused with no prior showing that the declarant is
unavailable. Doubts about whether such a statement is truly "reliable"
made some commentators wary of reading Roberts to sanction categorical admission of such statements without case-by-case showings of
the statement's indicia of reliability. 56
Moreover, some "firmly-rooted" exceptions to the hearsay rule are
based on assumptions other than that the evidence is reliable. For
example, the rule that permits certain statements by an employee to
be offered against the employer is based on agency principles and the
adversary system, not on the statement's reliability. 57 The co-conspirator exception also is based, at least in part, on an agency theory. s
Even exceptions originally believed to be based on an assumption of
reliability now are believed to lack that foundation. For example,

55. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
56. See, e.g., 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 801(d)(2)(E)[01],
at 801-2.35 (1985); Note, supra note 3. Indeed, the Court itself has noted that every set of
exceptions seems to fit an apt description offered more than 40 years ago: 'an old-fashioned
crazy quilt made of patches cut from a group of paintings by cubists, futurists and surrealists."'
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 (1980) (quoting Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and
Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 909, 921 (1937)).
57. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2), advisory committee note, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183,
298 (1972).
58. See Comment, Reason and the Rules: PersonalKnowledge and CoconspiratorHearsay,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 1265, 1270-76 (1987) (noting the potential unreliability of co-conspirator
statements, and suggesting that the true basis for this exception to the rule against hearsay is
prosecutorial convenience).
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"excited utterances" were thought to be reliable because the excitement would prevent a witness from having the time and presence of
mind necessary to shape a lie. Psychological studies, however, suggest
that exciting or startling events may disturb one's ability to perceive
accurately and thus may impair, not enhance, the reliability of one's
"excited utterances." 59
These concerns raised doubts that the Court would interpret
Roberts literally to "constitutionalize" all firmly-rooted exceptions to
the hearsay rule. In a recent decision, however, the Court said that
it did intend for this language from Roberts to have general application.
In Bourjaily v. United States,60 decided in 1987, the Court concluded
that the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is "steeped in
our jurisprudence.

'1

As such, courts need not "embark on an independ-

ent inquiry into the reliability of statements that satisfy the requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E)." 62
The current Court therefore seems inclined to accept the common
law hearsay rule and its exceptions as sufficient protection of confrontation clause values. This approach differs from that of the 1970s
decisions, wherein the justices emphasized that although the confrontation clause and the hearsay rule "stem from the same roots," the
two are not equivalent.63 In often quoted language, the Court in
Californiav. Green 4 explained its view of the relationship between
the hearsay rule and the confrontation guarantee as follows:

59. See, e.g., Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28 COLUM.
L. REV. 432 (1928). Despite these studies, however, the federal rules preserve the excited
utterance exception, FED. R. EVID. 803(2), and both federal and state courts have concluded
that the indicia of trustworthiness commonly thought to underlie this exception render excited
utterances "reliable" enough for confrontation purposes. See, e.g., Haggins v. Warden, Fort
Pillow State Farm, 715 F.2d 1050, 1055-58 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1071 (1984);
State v. St. Jean, 469 A.2d 736, 739 (R.I. 1983).
60. 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987).
61. Id. at 2783.
62. Id. See Goldman, Not So "FirmlyRooted": Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66
N.C.L. REV. 1, 9-11 (1987). The Court's approach to the confrontation clause is rather like its
approach to the difficult question of whether a federal court can use a particular federal rule
of civil procedure in a diversity suit when a state rule of procedure conflicts with the federal
rule. In Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), the Court established a difficult-to-rebut presumption that the federal rules of civil procedure do not violate the principle of Erie. In this context,
as in the context of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court's ruling effectively preserves the
uniformity of the rules and greatly reduces the prospect of successful challenges of their constitutionality.
63. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970).
64. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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[W]hile it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and
the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect
similar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest that
the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause
is nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of
hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at
common law. Our decisions have never established such a
congruence; indeed, we have more than once found a violation
of confrontation values even though the statements in issue
were admitted under an arguably recognized hearsay exception . . . . The converse is equally true: merely because
evidence is admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay
rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation lights have been denied.s
The justices now appear ready to abandon the Green view of hearsay and confrontation as related, but independent, concepts. They
apparently are warming to Wigmore's argument that whenever the
hearsay rules, as they evolve, are satisfied, the confrontation clause
requirements also are met. 6
This conflation of the hearsay rules and the sixth amendment likely
was prompted by the Court's frustration in attempts to develop a
workable, independent theory of the clause. Having stated that reliability is the key to the confrontation guarantee, the Court was faced
with unattractive consequences.6 7 Basing the constitutionality of hearsay testimony on reliability could have meant that defendants could

65. Id. at 155-56.
66. 5 J. WIGMTORE, EVIDENCE § 1397, at 155-62 (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1974). The Court
often will defer to the lower courts and state and federal legislatures on evidence issues. One

reason for this is the justices' relative lack of familiarity with the rules and their practical
consequences. As the Court once stated:
This Court ... has contributed little to this or to any phase of the law of evidence,
for the reason, among others, that it has had extremely rare occasion to decide
such issues ....
It is obvious that a court which can make only infrequent sallies
into the field cannot recast the body of case law on this subject in many, many
years, even if it were clear what the rules should be.
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948).
67. The Court outlined four characteristics of "reliable" evidence in Dutton v. Evans. They
are:
1. Whether the statement contains an assertion of past fact;
2. Whether the declarant had personal knowledge of the facts he or she related;
3. Whether the government's evidence excluded the possibility that the declarant
acted on a faulty recollection; and
4. Whether the circumstances under which the assertion was made provided any
reason to believe that the declarant misrepresented the truth.
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970).
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challenge all hearsay statements on sixth amendment grounds and
force courts to evaluate the "reliability" of each hearsay statement
before ruling on the objection. This prospect must have seemed daunting, and perhaps unnecessary, to a Court that already perceives the

courts to be seriously overworked. Even the less formidable task of
actually evaluating the reliability of statements under each category
of extant hearsay exceptions looked uninviting. Instead, the Court in
effect conferred constitutional status on the past practice of allowing
certain hearsay evidence to be admitted, even in criminal trials, and
simply declared the evidence within these exceptions to be "reliable
without more." The only questions this approach leaves open are when
an extant exception can be called "firmly-rooted," and when an exception that is not firmly-rooted nevertheless bears "indicia of reliability"

sufficient for constitutional approval. 68 This preserves the prevailing

68. Of course, the Court's definition of the content of the confrontation guarantee does not
resolve other questions about its application, such as when that right arises. The Court has
concluded that the defendant's right to confront an adverse witness does not entitle him to be
present at every stage of the criminal proceeding. Its analytical dilemma lies in deciding which
stages of the criminal prosecution trigger this right, and in squaring these decisions with its
confrontation clause theory. A recent attempt to clarify this aspect of the sixth amendment
mustered agreement by only four justices.
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. 989 (1987), the Court considered whether a defendant
charged with incest had a constitutional right to access records concerning his daughter that
were maintained by the state agency charged with investigations of child abuse. Id. at 994. The
defendant claimed that both due process and the confrontation clause entitled him to the entire
confidential files of the agency. Addressing his sixth amendment claim, the Court identified two
types of protection under the confrontation clause: first, it entitles the defendant to physically
face his accusers; second, it entitles him to conduct cross-examination. Id. at 998. The defendant
was not excluded from the trial, and no out-of-court statement was improperly used against
him. Thus, the first type of protection was not at stake. Id. Rather, the defendant's only sixth
amendment argument was that denial of access to the files interfered with his right to meaningful
cross-examination. Id. The plurality rejected this argument, noting that 'the right of confrontation is a trial right, designed to prevent improper restrictions on the types of questions that
defense counsel may ask during cross-examination." Id. at 999 (emphasis in original). It does
not require pretrial disclosure of all potentially useful information that may assist counsel in
cross-examination at trial. Id. According to four justices, the confrontation clause right
to cross-examine witnesses is implicated only when there is "a specific statutory or court-imposed
restriction at trial on the scope of questioning." Id. at 1000 (emphasis added). Other portions
of the Constitution - specifically the due process and compulsory process clauses - may afford
a defendant protection at the pretrial stage and may require disclosure of certain information;
id., but the confrontation clause is not the text on which to base claims of a constitutional right
to discovery. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
The obvious problem with this conclusion is that meaningful cross-examination at trial may
be impossible without pretrial access to exculpatory or impeaching materials. The concurring
and dissenting opinions in Ritchie emphasize this point. Ritchie, 107 S.Ct. at 1009 (Brennan,
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rules about hearsay, which at least are familiar and have been accepted
over time. Of course, should federal or state courts decide at some
future point to reject the complicated body of rules and exceptions
that surround the hearsay doctrine in favor of a simplified rule, (e.g.,
only trustworthy out-of-court statements are admissible), then the
Court would need to rethink the wisdom of anchoring the sixth amendment to this older, confounding body of principles.

J., dissenting). Given the Court's theory that the confrontation guarantee represents constitutional protection of the opportunity for "cross-examination," the Ritchie plurality's analysis
appears wrong-headed.
Only four months later, the Court abandoned the Ritchie 'trial only" limitation on the
confrontation clause. In Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658 (1987), the Court held that the
defendant's exclusion from a hearing to determine the competency of the two key witnesses
against him - young girls - did not violate his confrontation clause rights. Id. The defendant
was accused of sexually abusing both girls. Id. at 2660. The competency hearing was held in
the judge's chambers in the presence of the defendant's lawyer, who asked the girls questions. Id.
The Court determined that the confrontation analysis should not hinge on whether a competency hearing is part of the "trial"per se, or should be labeled a "pretrial" procedure. Rather,
the appropriate question is whether the defendant's exclusion from this hearing would interfere
with his opportunity for effective cross-examination of these witnesses at trial. Id. at 2664. The
Court concluded that his exclusion did not interfere with his opportunity for cross-examination.
Both girls appeared at trial and testified in open court, at which point they were subject to
any questions by the defendant that might have been raised at the competency hearing. Id.
The rule that emerges from this line of cases is that the confrontation clause only assures
an opportunity for full and effective cross-examination at trial. This opportunity, however,
includes the defendant's right to physical presence at the trial itself, and at any other phase of
the criminal prosecution at which defendant's exclusion would interfere with his ability to crossexamine a witness at trial.
The effect of these cases on past rulings is unclear. For example, the Court has held that
exclusion of a defendant from the jury selection phase violates the confrontation clause. See
Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 373-74 (1892). The rationale of the case was not the
functional analysis that characterizes modem confrontation cases, but that the "dictates of
humanity" require a defendant be given the advantage of inclining the hearts of the jurors to
listen with indulgence to his defense. Id. at 372. Such language, of course, sounds mawkish
when compared to the stern, practical tone of recent confrontation decisions. Earlier cases also
had stated that the defendant's confrontation clause right to be present extended to any stage
"when anything may be done in the prosecution by which he is to be affected." Id. at 373.
The current Court is unlikely to read the confrontation guarantee as broadly as it has in
past decisions. In fact, the Court probably already has gone farther than it intended to in
suggesting that the sixth amendment imposes restrictions on pretrial procedures. Meaningful
access to information at the pretrial stage already is protected by the due process and compulsory
process clauses. Yet if one accepts the Court's premise that the confrontation clause assures
meaningful cross-examination, then the Ritchie "trial-only" restriction makes little sense. The
problem therefore lies in this underlying premise.
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3. Adequate Opportunity for Cross-Examination
The remnants of Roberts suggest that unavailability of the declarant
is unimportant; rather, the key is whether the declarant's out-of-court
statement is reliable. If the statement falls within a firmly-rooted
exception, then it is presumed to be reliable. Otherwise, the statement
must have comparable indicia of trustworthiness.
The Court's conclusion that reliability is the central value of the
confrontation clause stems from its assumption that the clause was
intended to assure the opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses
against the accused.69 Because the Court views cross-examination as
a useful vehicle for testing witness credibility and sincerity, it sees
the confrontation clause as a constitutional guarantee of these underlying interests. Thus, the reliability that confrontation guarantees is
the reliability that can be derived from cross-examination of the witness against the accused. However, in recent confrontation cases the
Court has emphasized that the sixth amendment guarantees only the
opportunity for cross-examination; it does not guarantee cross-examination that is "effective, in whatever way, and to whatever extent,
the defense might wish." 7o
If the opportunity for cross-examination satisfies the confrontation
guarantee, then courts must determine when that opportunity has
been provided. These judgments have been very difficult for the Court
to make, and harder still to defend. According to the Court's 1970s
decisions, a belated opportunity for cross-examination can be a constitutionally sufficient substitute for the chance to cross-examine a
witness contemporaneously with his or her original testimony.7' For
example, the prosecution can introduce the preliminary hearing testi-

69. The Court repeatedly has observed that the confrontation clause serves the functional
purpose of protecting the opportunity for cross-examination. See, e.g., Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at
2664; Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974); Nelson
v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 626-27 (1971); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157-58 (1970); Bruton
v. United States, 391 U.S. 128, 126 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-19 (1965);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404-05, 407 (1965); see also 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367,
at 32 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974) (noting that cross-examination is a "vital feature of our Law.
.. beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.").
Justice Harlan, who first believed that the clause established a preference for live witnesses,
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 186-87 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring), later renounced that view and sided
with Wigmore in concluding that the confrontation guarantee protects the defendant's right to
be present and to cross-examine adverse witnesses. Dutton, 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
70. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam); see also United States v.
Owens, 108 S.Ct. 838, 843 (1988); Stincer, 107 S.Ct. at 2664 (1987).
71. See Green, 399 U.S. at 159-60.
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mony of a witness if the witness appears at the trial, admits making
the preliminary hearing statements, but claims he or she no longer
can remember the underlying events.72 The Court also has approved
the admission of preliminary hearing testimony of a witness who did
not appear at trial, when the defendant's lawyer had an opportunity
to question that witness at the preliminary hearing. The Court
likewise has permitted a co-defendant to testify about the activities
described in an out-of-court confession, even though in court he denied
making the confession and claimed its substance was false. 4 In all of
these situations, the Court deemed the defendant's "opportunity" for
cross-examination of the declarant sufficient to satisfy the sixth amendment, regardless of whether the defendant's lawyer seized that opportunity.
In contrast, the Court believes that no adequate opportunity for
cross-examination occurs when a judge prevents a defendant from
inquiring into possible bias of a witness. In Delaware v. Van Arsdall,7 5
the trial court had denied the defendant any opportunity to inquire
into the state's dismissal of a pending public drunkenness charge
against an adverse witness.7 6 Disclosure of this possible bias in favor
of the state could have given the jury a significantly different impression of the witness's credibility.- Consequently, the Supreme Court
held that this limitation on cross-examination violated the defendant's
right to "confront" the witness. The Court added that its holding did

72.

Id. at 152.

73. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 70 (1980). When, however, the defendant does not have
a lawyer representing him or her at the preliminary hearing, the witness's prior testimony
cannot be introduced against him or her if the witness does not appear at the trial. See Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).

74. Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971). Contrast this situation with a case in which the
confessing witness appears at the trial, but invokes the fifth amendment. In Douglas v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 415 (1965), the Court held that such a confession could not be introduced through the
guise of "refreshing" the witness's recollection. The witness in Douglas never affirmed the
statement as his, and refused to answer any questions on the ground that he was entitled to
invoke the fifth while an appeal of his conviction was pending. Id. at 416.
75. 475 U.S. 673 (1986).

76. Id. at 676.
77. Id. at 680. The Court rejected the state's argument that a confrontation clause violation
only occurs when the defendant can show "outcome-determinative" prejudice. Id. at 679-80.
Unlike some other constitutional claims, 'the focus of the Confrontation Clause is on individual

witnesses." Id. at 680. The Court added, though, that this does not prevent a court from finding
on appeal that such a violation is "harmless error" within the meaning of Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 47.5 U.S. at 681.
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not prevent a trial judge from imposing reasonable limits on crossexamination of an adverse witness as necessary to prevent harassment,
prejudice, confusion, or a waste of time. 78
The Court's dubious conclusions about the adequacy and effectiveness of the questioning in these cases are less surprising when one
recalls that other confrontation cases allow hearsay to be offered
against a defendant even when the defendant had no opportunity for
cross-examination. Dying declarations, 79 documentary evidence used
to establish collateral facts, 8° and letters, book entries and bank deposit
slips used to link the defendant to other evidence,81 all have been
approved as constitutionally acceptable departures from the rule
against hearsay. Moreover, as we have seen, the Court has approved
the admission of co-conspirator statements even when the co-conspirator was not present for cross-examination by the accused.- These
decisions make it fairly easy for the Court to conclude that the "opportunity" for cross-examination is one way - but not the exclusive way
- to satisfy the "reliability" theory set forth in Roberts.8
The flaw in this reasoning should by now be apparent. Whether
or not these results are defensible, "reliability" of the evidence is an
unconvincing rationale for the Court's applications of the sixth amendment. Dying declarations, statements of co-conspirators, renounced
confessions, or excited utterances that are not cross-examined simply
are not "great hearsay"; however, they may be necessary or "fair"
hearsay. The reliability theory fails to explain these results and offers
no guidepost for future application other than the suggestion that
"past practice" regarding hearsay will prevail. Thus, reliability cannot
be the true rationale for these decisions. Other reasons likely better
explain the Court's answers to the confrontation clause problems it
has considered.

78. 475 U.S. at 679; see also Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985) (per curiam). The
Court in Fenstererheld no confrontation violation occurred when the expert who testified against

the defendant said she no longer could remember the basis for her opinion that the hair on the
weapon was similar to the victim's and had been forcibly removed. Id. at 20. The inability of

the defendant to re-call this expert to the stand did not so frustrate the opportunity for crossexamination that the sixth amendment was violated. Id. The Court noted that the defendant's
own expert had testified that the state's expert relied on a baseless theory. Id.
79. DowdeU v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237

(1895).
80.
81.
82.
83.

Dowdell, 221 U.S. at 325.
Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542 (1926).
See, e.g., United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
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B. Assumptions that Underlie the Reliability Theory
1. Prosecutorial Efficiency
Several extrinsic policy concerns probably have influenced the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts' approach to the confrontation guarantee. One of these concerns is prosecutorial efficiency. Both of the
recent clarifications of Roberts have the effect of preserving the prosecutor's ability to introduce hearsay against the defendant. The tone
of these recent decisions is more distinctly deferential to prosecutorial
interests than the tone of past decisions.' Specifically, the Court has
made explicit that the government's interest in effective law enforcement should counterbalance the defendant's interest in confronting the
witnesses against him., In Inadi, the Court made the remarkable
statement that admitting hearsay against a defendant may further the
confrontation clause's mission, which it describes as the attempt to
enhance the accuracy of criminal trials.s In another opinion, Justice
Rehnquist observes that the Court has "attempted to harmonize the
goal of the Clause - placing limits on the kind of evidence that may
be received against a defendant - with a societal interest in accurate
fact-finding, which may require consideration of out-of-court statements."8
In earlier confrontation cases, in contrast, the Court's emphasis
on reliability was based on the justices' concern for the defendant,
not society. Exclusion of hearsay evidence, like exclusion of any potentially probative evidence, always poses the threat of undermining the
overall truth-seeking aim of the trial. But this overall interest in
accuracy - the "societal" interest - necessarily is sacrificed to the
extent that the Bill of Rights imposes certain limits on the prosecution
that favor the accused. One of these limits is the confrontation clause.
Language in the Court's recent opinions turns such thinking on its
head. Certain passages even suggest that prosecutors could argue that
exclusion of "probative" hearsay offered against a defendant could
thwart the defendant's confrontation clause right. This sounds wrong,
because it is wrong.

84. The Burger Court adhered to a crime-control model of criminal justice. One characteristic
of this model is deference to the government interest in prosecutorial efficiency. As Professor
Whitebread has observed, the Burger Court conducted a "counter revolution" in criminal procedure, designed in part to assist law enforcement efforts. See Whitebread, The Burger Court's
Counterrevolution in CriminalProcedure,24 WASHBURN L.J. 471 (1981). The Burger Court's
confrontation cases corroborate Whitebread's observation.
85. See, e.g., Inadi, 475 U.S. at 395; Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980).
86. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 396.
87. Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2782 (1987) (emphasis added).
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The root of the analytical problem here is the notion that "reliability" of evidence is the full and sole measure of confrontation clause
5 Reliability may
protection.A
be enhanced by the confrontation requirement in some cases; but, it does not follow from this that all reliable
evidence satisfies the clause, or that the only purpose of the clause
is to enhance reliability. Also, any interest in reliable evidence that
may be reflected in the confrontation guarantee is reserved for the
defendant. Only the witnesses against the accused, not those who
speak for him or her, must be present for confrontation. The confrontation guarantee is a defendant-centered right and cannot reasonably
be read as a general assurance of trials based on reliable evidence.
Any acceptable theory about the confrontation guarantee must be
sensitive to the practicalities of criminal litigation. No one favors constitutional procedures that make law enforcement impossible. To that
extent, "prosecutorial efficiency" needs necessarily are an implicit factor in the constitutional analysis. But the Court's reliability theory
does more than accommodate this practical concern; it weights the
government interest as an express counterbalance to the defendant's
confrontation clause right. Thus, governmental interest becomes more
than a curb on an overbroad reading of the sixth amendment; it becomes part of the calculus of determining whether the right exists,
and whether the right can be excused in a particular circumstance.
The effect is a form of double-counting of governmental interest. One
can assume that the "cost" of excluding nonconfronted testimony was
considered by the colonists when they decided to give the right of
confrontation constitutional status. Their decision was that the defendant's interest in confrontation trumps the government's interest in
prosecutorial efficiency.
2. "Necessity"
Closely related to the Court's growing concern for prosecutorial
efficiency is a "necessity" factor, which figures in all confrontation
decisions. As early as 1895, the Court noted that when a declarant
has died, his or her hearsay statements may be admissible "as an

88.

See, e.g., Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2662 (1987) ('The right to confrontation

... is essentially a 'functional' right designed to promote reliability in the truth finding functions
of a criminal trial."); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972) (stating that reliability has
been the focus of the Court's confrontation clause decisions); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89
(1970) ("[Tihe mission ... is. . . a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining
process in criminal trials by assuring that 'the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating
the truth of the prior statement."') (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)).
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exception to such rules [regarding the admission of testimony], simply
from the necessities of the case, and to prevent a manifest failure of
justice. '"'3 The Court has made the sensible observation that "[a] technical adherence to the letter of a constitutional provision may occasionally be carried further than is necessary to the just protection of the
accused, and further than the safety of the public will warrant."'
The problem with this sensible observation is that the Court has
resolved the tension between the "letter" of the confrontation clause
and the "necessities of the case" quite differently throughout history.
For example, in Bruton v. United States, decided in 1968, the government argued that joint trials save money, and that the confrontation
clause should not be interpreted in a fashion that makes joint trials
infeasible. 91 The Court rejected that argument because it viewed the
intangible price of sacrificing fundamental principles of constitutional
liberty as far greater than the expense of ordering separate trials.w
Evidencing a marked shift in approach, the Court in 1987 expressed
concern that an expansive confrontation requirement would require
separate trials of defendants, 93 and emphasized the expense of separate
trials.9
The central issue is not whether economic concerns or other practical necessities ever should qualify our interpretation of the confrontation guarantee; people agree that occasions arise when out-of-court
statements reasonably should be admitted despite the declarant's absence. 95 Rather, the controversy lies in deciding where to draw the
line. Certainly, more than a "need to convict" must be shown to justify
exceptions to the right to confront one's accusers. The "something
more" that the Court traditionally has required are the "indicia of
reliability" described above. In recent cases, however, the justices

89. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895).
90. Id. at 243.
91. 391 U.S. 123, 134-35 (1968).
92. Id.
93. Richardson v. Marsh, 107 S. Ct. 1702, 1708 (1987).
94. Id.
95. An appealing example of this might be a case in which a defendant is tried for the
gruesome murder of an elderly, fragile woman. If the woman had stated to the police shortly
before her death, "Defendant did this to me. I don't know why; I loved him like a son. Forgive
him, dear God," most people probably would have difficulty accepting a rule that excluded her
statement and hence entitled the defendant to an acquittal.
If, on the other hand, Lord Cobham had said on his death bed "Raleigh is a traitor. He is
a treasonous soul. May the Crown forgive us," exclusion of this evidence may seem less offensive.
Explaining our different reactions to these two scenarios, however, is not easy. The relative
"reliability" of the two statements is only a partial clue.
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have given greater weight to the "need to convict," and have revealed
their ambivalence about robust confrontation clause protection.
The "necessity" factor in some of the older confrontation cases
therefore poses a hidden danger for future confrontation analysis.
Inadi suggests that hearsay should be admitted if it is "reliable," even
though the declarant may be available. If the Court is inclined to
cabin the confrontation clause and thereby promote the interests of
federalism and prosecutorial efficiency, it could cite the hearsay evidence that it has deemed admissible in the past as a standard for
constitutional reliability in the future. But these earlier rulings hinged
less on the "reliability" of the hearsay than on a practical realization
that face-to-face confrontation is not always possible. Thus, the reliability theory should not be applied retrospectively to justify or explain
these decisions; likewise, these older cases should not be misinterpreted as benchmarks of "reliability" under confrontation clause
analysis. A fair construction of past precedent must take into account
whether the declarant was available, as well as other "necessity" factors that contributed to the results.
3. Competing Concerns
Although the Court has been willing to admit "great hearsay"
despite the sixth amendment, the justices on occasion have expressed
their fear of admitting hearsay that is devastating, or "too great."
This apprehension surfaces in joint trial situations, where the jury
may be instructed that certain "devastating" statements are admissible
96
against one defendant and not his or her co-defendant.
The confrontation clause requires that witnesses against the defendant confront him. Thus, if A and B are tried together, A's confession
implicating both A and B cannot be offered against B without raising
constitutional concerns. As against A, the statement is admissible
because it is A's own statement. A cannot claim that she had no right
to confront herself. If the government offers the confession only
against A, it theoretically poses no confrontation clause problem vis-avis B, provided that the jury is told that the damaging confession can
be used only against A.
The obvious difficulty with this analysis is our practical awareness
that despite limiting instructions, jurors are human beings who may
be unable to "unhear" A's confession implicating B. The Court acknowledges this, and thus has concluded that the presumption of juror

96. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-36 (1968) (referring to the 'powerfully
incriminating" nature of the hearsay statements).
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obedience should be abandoned in favor of recognizing human frailties
when the evidence that the jury is asked to disregard is "devastating"
to B. 97 The confession of a co-defendant that implicates B typically
will satisfy this criterion.9

97. Compare Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 242 (1957) ("Unless we proceed
on the basis that the jury will follow the court's instructions where those instructions are clear
and the circumstances are such that the jury can reasonably be expected to follow them, the
jury system makes little sense.") with Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 124, 128 (1968)
(overruling Delli Paoli and noting that "The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be
overcome by instructions to the jury... all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."')
(quoting Krulewiteh v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949)). The conclusion that jurors
cannot "unhear" evidence despite instructions to disregard it is gaining empirical support as
researchers explore the problem. See Marotte, "The Jury Will Disregard.. .", A.B.A. J., Nov.
1987, at 34.
98. In Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979), a plurality of the Court modified Bruton
and concluded that the presumption that jurors will follow the judge's instructions will apply
to allow a co-defendant's confession if the defendant also has made a confession that corroborates
or 'interlocks" with the co-defendant's confession. This is the so-called "interlocking confession"
exception to the Bruton rule. See generally Note, The Present Status of an Interlocking Confession Exception to Bruton v. United States, 36 S.C.L. REv. 659, 688 (1985) (reviewing
post-Parkercases and concluding that Parker"exaggerated what was already a serious lack of
consensus in the lower courts.").
Three recent post-Parkercases alter the Bruton-Parkerapproach to interlocking and noninterlocking co-defendant confessions. In Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), the Court held that
the defendant's confrontation right was violated when her co-defendant's confession was admitted
in their joint trial. Writing for five members of the Court, Justice Brennan applied the Roberts
two-part test and concluded that confessions are presumptively unreliable and hence inadmissible
unless the evidence is supported by a showing of trustworthiness. Id. at 2064. When, as in Lee,
the co-defendant confesses after the 'Jig is up," such trustworthiness is missing. Likewise, when
the two confessions only interlock in some respects, the co-defendant's confession is only selectively reliable, and thus violates Roberts. Id. In 1987, the Court's newest member, Justice
Scalia, authored two decisions that expand on Lee and undermine Parker. In Cruz v. New
York, 107 S. Ct. 1714 (1987), the Court rejected the Parker view that interlocking confessions
are a categorical exception to the Bruton rule that jury instructions are inadequate protection
against "devastating" hearsay. Justice Scalia observed that the more "interlocking" a co-defendant's confession is, the more "devastating" it will be to a defendant's claim of innocence. Id.
at 1718. The interlocking nature of a confession pertains not to its harmfulness, but to its
reliability. Id. This interlock therefore is relevant to the Roberts reliability step in confrontation
analysis, but not to the Bruton inquiry into whether a jury is likely to obey its instructions to
disregard the evidence. Id. at 1718-19.
Read together, Lee and Cruz suggest that a majority of the Court believes that an interlocking
confession can interlock enough to satisfy Roberts, and hence be constitutionally admissible.
This requires more than the partial interlock present in Lee. If, however, the confession is not
"reliable" or "interlocking" enough to satisfy Roberts, then Bruton requires a court to ask
whether jury instructions will provide adequate protection of the confrontation guarantee. A
co-defendant's noninterlocking confession is presumptively too "devastating" for jurors to ignore
it. Even an "interlocking" confession ordinarily will be deemed too devastating for jurors to
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The "devastating" nature of nonconfronted evidence therefore has
played a role in the Court's confrontation analysis; but, the Court
restricts that role to the issue of whether jury instructions to disregard
the evidence as to the accused will provide adequate protection of his
or her confrontation rights." It is not a factor that the Court explicitly
cites as relevant to a decision about whether the nonconfronted evidence is admissible against an accused. Nevertheless, the "devastating" or central character of the nonconfronted evidence probably plays
a subliminal role in determinations about whether admission of the
evidence is constitutional.100 It competes, though, with the justices'
concerns about prosecutorial efficiency. After all, if the hearsay is
"devastating," its admission probably is as important (or "necessary")
to the prosecution's case as its exclusion is to the defendant's freedom.
The justices may want to admit this "really great hearsay," especially
when it offers probative and essential proof that the defendant is

"unhear" it and obey their instructions. The interlocking nature of the confession, however, still
may have a bearing on whether the confrontation clause violation is ruled "harmless error" on
appeal.
In Richardson v. Marsh, 107 S. Ct. 1702 (1987), the Court concluded that jury instructions
were adequate protection for a defendant when the co-defendant's confession was redacted to
omit the defendant's name and any reference to her existence. Id. at 1709.
The collective message for prosecutors in these recent cases is to proceed with joint trials,
and to pursue one of two avenues when introducing a co-defendant's confession. The first option
is to argue that the confession meets some exception to the applicable hearsay rule - possibly,
the residual exception to the hearsay rules - and also that it is sufficiently reliable to satisfy
Roberts. Under this approach the confession would be admissible against the nonconfessing
defendant. Reliability of this kind of evidence, however, will be difficult to prove without
compelling corroboration, despite the Court's suggestion that a sufficiently "interlocking" confession might have this corroboration. The second route the prosecutor would follow would be to
introduce the confession only against its maker, with proper instructions to the jury to disregard
it as to the nondeclarant defendant, and to redact that confession to omit any reference to the
nondeclarant defendant. This method was approved in Richardson.
99. One decision that may suggest otherwise is Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), in
which the Court noted that the hearsay statement was not crucial or devastating and concluded
that no confrontation violation occurred. Id. at 87. A better interpretation of this holding,
however, is that offered by Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion. Justice Blackmun viewed
the admission of the statement in Dutton as harmless error, in light of the other overwhelming
evidence against the accused. Id. at 90 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
100. See infra text accompanying note 152. At least one commentator agrees that the
centrality of the hearsay statement has a bearing on whether it violates the confrontation clause,
and views the "devastating" nature of the hearsay as relevant to its centrality. See Kirkpatrick,
Confrontationand Hearsay: Exemptions from the Constitutional UnavailabilityRequirement,
70 MINN. L. REV. 665, 682-83, 687 (1986). His theory, however, essentially comports with the
Court's functional approach to the confrontation guarantee.
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guilty, but must overcome a nagging sense that even terrific hearsay
violates some fundamental principle of fairness - a principle they
trace to the confrontation guarantee.
These three factors - prosecutorial efficiency, "necessity," and
the "devastating" or central nature of the hearsay - surely play a
role in the Court's confrontation clause applications. The reliability
theory, as it currently is stated, masks their importance by attaching
a single "reliable" label to outcomes that turn on multiple factors. The
Court's desire for a clear and simply-stated principle is understandable,
particularly when it must be applied in the brisk-paced context of a
criminal trial. But the reliability theory is not the answer. The Court
in its most recent confrontation clause cases seems finally to recognize
this problem, and turns its attention to other values of face-to-face
confrontation.
C.

The Departurefrom Reliability: Coy v. Iowa

The Court's past interpretations of the confrontation guarantee
imply that the central value of a face-to-face encounter between defendant and accuser is to enhance the reliability of the accuser's testimony.
They also suggest that the confrontation clause sets a reliability
threshold for out-of-court declarations offered by the government in
criminal cases. This imaginary, and perhaps illusory, "reliability"
threshold is overcome whenever an out-of-court statement falls within
an historically recognized exception to the hearsay rule. The statement
also will be admissible when the defendant has had some "opportunity"
to cross-examine the declarant, regardless of whether the defendant
actually seized that opportunity. The Court has approved the admission
of this "reliable" hearsay against a defendant even though the declarant
is available and could have appeared before the tribunal.
The Court's reliability theory, however, ignores relevant constitutional interests. Limiting the confrontation clause to functional ends,
and linking it to the rule against hearsay may promote the goals of
certainty and efficiency, but it also could render constitutional trial
by telephone,'' trial by closed-circuit television,10 2 or even trial by
affidavit, provided that these types of out-of-court testimony are
deemed sufficiently "reliable." Also, much evidence that falls within
"firmly-rooted exceptions" to the common law hearsay rules may be
of doubtful reliability. 10 3

101. See Lawrence, Phone Appeals Won't Replace Interviews, Gainesville Sun, Oct. 8, 1987,
at 4A, Col.3.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 120-25.
103. See Goldman, supra note 62, at 16-26.
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The poverty of the reliability theory of confrontation appears when
one uses that interpretation to justify departures from the confrontation guarantee, rather than to describe some of the benefits that may
flow from the guarantee. Some of the values of face-to-face confrontation may be intangible, and not susceptible to functional analysis. Also,
confrontation may promote certain functional values that the reliability
theory omits, such as the preservation of the appearance of a fair
proceeding, which may enhance the acceptability of the outcome to
the defendant and society. Thus, when the Court devises alternatives
to the right that supply only the tangible benefit that the Court names
in its reliability theory, the alternatives can prove to be inadequate
substitutes for the whole value of the confrontation right. That is,
"reliable" evidence is not always a satisfactory substitute for confrontation.1o4
In a 1987 dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall acknowledged this
other value of confrontation when he observed that the confrontation
clause serves certain "symbolic goals" in addition to its functional
purpose of assuring evidence reliability. 105 Quoting Lee v. Illinois,06
he noted that the defendant's right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses preserves the "appearance of fairness" of the proceeding.
This appearance of fairness means that accused and accuser should
engage in an "open and even contest in a public trial," and that "convictions will not be based on the charges of unseen and unknownhence unchallengeable individuals."'

104. See infra text accompanying notes 130-51. The Court's theory may collide with commonly-held expectations about criminal procedure. For example, assume that two people are

arrested for treason and questioned separately. Each of them confesses to the crime in terms
that corroborate the other's confession. In the separate trial of one of them, the confession of
the other, which implicates the defendant, is read to the jury. The state never calls the confessing
witness to the stand.
Such out-of-court confessions historically have not been admissible against a defendant. See
supra note 98. Yet, the detail of the confession and its interlocking character, as well as the
fact that it incriminates the speaker, suggests that this is 'reliable" hearsay. The Court's thinking
suggests that a prosecutor could argue that exclusion of this evidence would thwart the confron-

tation clause's truth-seeking mission. Moreover, this thinking would appeal to people who believe
that modern constitutional criminal procedure unduly hampers prosecutorial efforts. The government also can argue that the "societal" interest in prosecutorial efficiency favors admission of
interlocking confessions. But admission of this confession would be a dramatic departure from

past attitudes toward confrontation and confessions of co-conspirators. Yet, the Court's recent
cases set the stage for prosecutors to advance this very argument.
105.
106.
107.

Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2670 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986).
Id.
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Other people likewise have acknowledged this "fairness" aspect of
the right to confrontation. For example, Professor Kenneth Graham
has referred to the element of "folk justice, gut fairness, or adversary
sportsmanship"'0 inherent in the confrontation guarantee.
In Coy v. Iowa,'" decided in 1988, a "fairness" theory of the confrontation clause appeared for the first time in a majority opinion.
The Court concluded that the sixth amendment was violated when a
screen was placed between child witnesses and a defendant accused
of sexual assault.
Justice Scalia, writing for six members of the Court, stated that
confrontation "serves ends related both to appearances and to reality"' , and that "there is something deep in human nature that regards
face-to-face confrontation between accused and accuser as 'essential
to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution.' ",, Both the physical, face-toface confrontation, and the right to cross-examine the accuser serve
the function of ensuring the integrity of the proceeding.112 In Justice
Scalia's words, "[Ilt is always more difficult to tell a lie about a person
'to his face' than behind his back. In the former context, even if the
lie is told, it will often be told less convincingly."''1 Despite the potential trauma to the truthful child witness, the Court concluded face-toface presence should be required. A courtroom screen prevents the
4
type of face-to-face encounter that the sixth amendment guarantees.1
Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Rehnqulst dissented in Coy." 5
Justice Blackmun authored the dissent in which he disagreed both
with the majority's analysis of the confrontation clause and with its
specific result. He noted that under the common law definition of
confrontation, the right primarily was intended to allow for crossexamination, and secondarily to require the witness to appear before
the tribunal. Nothing in the Court's prior decisions suggested that
confrontation also requires that the witness be able to view the defen-

108. Sir Walter Raleigh, supra note 3, at 132-33.
109. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
110. Id. at 2801.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2801-02.
115. Id. Justice Kennedy did not participate in the decision. Justices O'Connor and White
concurred in the majority opinion for the limited reason of emphasizing their view that the
confrontation right is not absolute, and may on occasion give way to other interests. They cited
other state statutes that permit child witnesses to testify via closed-circuit television and noted
that such procedures may not violate the sixth amendment. Id.
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dant throughout his or her testimony.116 He criticized the majority for
relying on "literature, anecdote and dicta" for its definition of confrontation.11 7 Justice Blackmun acknowledged the constitutional preference
for face-to-face confrontation, but believed that the preference must
give way on occasion to other policy interests. He found compelling
the state interest behind the Iowa statute that allowed the child witness to testify with the use of a screening device. 118 Finally, he noted
that although the evidence in question did not fall into a "firmly rooted
hearsay exception," it had sufficient indicia of reliability, given that
the witnesses testified under oath, in full view of the jury, and were
subject to full cross-examination." 9
A fair reading of the Court's pre-Coy decisions indicates that Justice Blackmun is correct in his conclusion that the confrontation clause,
under past Supreme Court analysis, does not bar the use of a one-way
screen. Unavailability of the child witness is not - it seems - a
constitutional prerequisite to admission of hearsay after Inadi.2 0 Even
if it were, the child is certainly more "available" for cross-examination
than a witness who pleads the fifth,' 21 has died,'2 or has moved to
Sweden.'23 If indicia of reliability is the constitutional criterion, then
the child witness's testimony behind the screen likewise passes muster.
It is probably just as "strong" as testimony permitted under other
recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule, such as dying declarations
or excited utterances. Moreover, the tool that the Court regards as
the most significant check on unreliability, cross-examination, is allowed under this procedure, although not in the customary way. The
defendant's lawyer can ask the child questions in the physical presence
of the defendant. Indeed, testimony given via a one-way mirror or
behind a screen is not hearsay at all. The child is testifying "live" and
subject to contemporaneous cross-examination to probe memory, perception, ambiguity, and sincerity.'2

116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 2803.
Id.
Id. at 2804.
Id.

120.
121.

See supra text accompanying notes 45-50.
Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2782 (1987) (noting that the declarant

"exercised his right not to testify").
122.
128.

Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 209 (1972).

124. Under the Court's approach, when an out-of-court statement is not offered for a
hearsay purpose - for the truth of the matter asserted - then no confrontation problem arises.
See Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 407 (1985).
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Yet despite these safeguards for reliability, testimony from behind
a one-way mirror or screen disturbs many people's sense of "fairness,"
and the specific constitutional text that they sense it offends is the
confrontation clause. 1 As Coy suggests, the reason for this reaction
is that "confrontation" connotes a human, face-to-face contact. The
most important implication of Coy is that it shows that we value this
contact for purposes beyond reliability or efficiency.
The weakness of Coy therefore lies not in its result, but in its
loose reasoning and reliance on unconventional authority. This weakness stems from the Court's consistent failure, in both past and modern
procedure decisions, to identify the noninstrumental values of "fair
procedure" and to develop a theory of procedural justice that can
account for these values. Cases like Coy make manifest that an "accurate" outcome is not the sole measure of procedural fairness, and that
reliability is not the sole measure of confrontation clause values. But,
as Justice Blackmun suggests, the constitutional theory in support of
this claim requires a more developed analysis of "fairness" than Justice
Scalia supplied in Coy. Moreover, this theory should be rooted in
American constitutional history and developing constitutional values.
The remainder of this article attempts to develop this rationale. It
rejects a reliability theory in favor of a human dignity theory of procedural fairness, and attempts to apply that general theory to the
specific problem of the confrontation clause in criminal proceedings.
V.

AN INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY APPROACH TO CONFRONTATION

Pre-Coy confrontation analysis held that if a criminal proceeding
is based on reliable hearsay evidence, then it would be perceived as
fair. This analysis assumed that an accurate outcome is sufficient procedural protection of the criminal defendant. Many writers, however,
have challenged the assumption that an accurate outcome is the sole
measure of fair treatment of a defendant. 126 The essence of these

125. See, e.g., State v. Warford, 223 Neb. 368, 389 N.W.2d 575 (1986) (reviewing the
defendant's arguments that use of video cameras to present victim's testimony violated his right
to confront the witnesses against him); Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 177,
208 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984) (refusing to allow videotaped testimony absent legislative authority).

See supra note 4.
126. See, e.g., Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U.
Cmi. L. REv. 28 (1976); Micheiman, Formaland AssociationalAims in ProceduralDue Process,
in DUE PROCESS Noimos XVIII, at 126 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977); Pincoffs, Due
Process, Fraternity, and a Kantian Injunction, in DUE PROCESS Nomos XVIII, at 172 (J.
Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977); Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More
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writers' claims is that the procedural provisions of the Constitution,
such as the due process clause and the right to confrontation, "prevent
the government from treating individuals in the criminal process as
though they were objects."' To them, the appearance of fairness in
a criminal proceeding hinges not only on outcome accuracy, but also
requires that the procedures respect individual dignity. Process is not
merely a means to some other end, but itself is intrinsically valuable.m
Thus, for example, a criminal defendant is entitled to a hearing even
if a conviction is the certain result. Moreover, if for some reason the
jurors refuse to convict despite overwhelming evidence against the
accused, then the judge cannot override their acquittal.19
These writers' theory about the values of constitutional procedures
responds to the deficiencies of the Court's functional theory and provides a sound analytical basis for Coy v. Iowa. The argument in support
of this claim begins with a return to the history of the confrontation
guarantee.
The colonists chose to give the right to confront one's accusers
privileged - that is, constitutional - status. This decision implies
that they regarded face-to-face encounters as somehow "better" than
affidavits or deposition testimony. Their preference for face-to-face
encounters presumably stemmed from a notion that physical presence
of a witness before the fact finder and the accused, and oath and
cross-examination produced "better" testimony. The colonists may
have regarded this testimony as better than hearsay because (1) they
assumed that live testimony is more reliable than hearsay; (2) it would
otherwise help preserve the "fairness" of the criminal proceeding; or
(3) because of a combination of enhanced reliability and other "fairness"
values.

Responsive Approach to ProceduralProtection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111 (1978); Scanlon, Due
Process, in DUE PROCESS NoMos XVIII, at 93 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977).
These writers and their disagreement with the Court's utilitarian approach to due process
reflect two different normative models of procedure. 'Inthe criminal context, the two models
have been described as the "due process" and "crime control" models. See Packer, Two Models
of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964).
127. L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 13 (1985).

128. Id.
129. The jury's power to nullify statutory law and to acquit a defendant it deems not
blameworthy is controversial. See, e.g., Bonnie, Morality,Equality and Expertise:Renegotiating
the Relationship Between Psychiatryandthe CriminalLaw, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
L. 5, 10-12 (1984); Scheflin & Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 71-74 (Autumn 1980); Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right
to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168 (1972); Simpson, Jury Nullificationin the American System:
A Skeptical View, 54 TEx. L. REV. 488, 512-20 (1976).
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The first assumption, that face-to-face confrontation is valuable
only because it enhances reliability, reflects a belief that physical presence of a witness actually assists fact finders in assessing credibility,
that an oath may enhance sincerity, and that cross-examination is an
effective tool for uncovering falsehoods. In fact, human experience then and now - both supports and contradicts these assumptions.
For example, the physical presence of a witness may mislead or distract the fact finders as often as it may assist them. Personal attractiveness, wardrobe, mannerisms, unusual speech patterns, or other
visible characteristics of a witness that may be unrelated to truthfulness may influence whether the jurors or judge will credit a witness's
testimony. 130
Likewise, an oath will impress on a witness the need to tell the
truth only if that witness respects the oath 31 or fears punishment for
perjury. If the witness is unmoved by the oath or the consequences
of lying to the court, then the oath is an empty ritual. 132 Also, an oath
or affirmation to tell the "truth" does not protect the fact finder from
mistaken impressions. Out-and-out lies in court probably are unusual.

130. See, e.g., Fontes & Bundens, PersuasionDuring the Trial Process, in

PERSUASION:

NEW DIRECTIONS IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 259 (M. Roloff & G. Miller eds. 1980). One

commentator concludes that people generally do no better at detecting whether someone is lying
than they would if they chose randomly. See P. EKMAN, TELLING LIES 162 (1985).
Jurors may also misinterpret demeanor evidence, to the extent that emotional expression
varies among people and cultures. See S. ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 195-203 (1952). A quiet,
controlled, and impassive witness may be seen by some jurors as more credible than one who
is emotional or demonstrative. This difference in emotional expression, however, may have little
or nothing to do with the witness's veracity.
131. See Comment, supra note 3, at 749. For a comprehensive review of the historical
evolution of the oath and its essentially irrational basis, see Silving, The Oath: I, 68 YALE L.J.
1329 (1959).
132. The shift from an emphasis on presence to a reliability interpretation of the value of
confrontation might be explained, at least in part, by an eroding lack of confidence in oaths. In
more religious (or superstitious) times, the oath was perceived to be a weighty influence against
false testimony. See Silving, supra note 131. If it became clear after the trial that the witness
had lied, then the liar might be outcast from the community. In a rural, agrarian society, this
type of excommunication would be a grave, even life-threatening penalty. In an urban industrialized society, however, the threat of being known as a "liar" or being excommunicated from
a particular "community" may be far less serious a penalty. Moreover, a defendant who was a
true believer in the oath might find a certain satisfaction in the faith that the liar would be
punished by God, if not by man.
The loss of faith in the magical or religious power of the oath thus may have led us to rely
more heavily on "reason" or science. A "reliability" theory thus may be a substitute for lost
faith, and may allay fears that the law is arbitrary. This theory appears "scientific," and so
appeals to our modem, "rational" minds.
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More common causes of testimonial inaccuracy are witness uncertainty
or mistaken recollection due to imperfect perception, faulty memory,
or the distortion of testimony caused by repeated or slanted questioning by authorities or attorneys. 13 Indeed, some testimonial inaccuracy
may be produced by the very nature of witness examination at trial."M
None of these reliability problems is cured by an oath or by physical
presence of the witness.
The effectiveness of cross-examination in uncovering falsehood
probably is limited. First, a lawyer cannot conduct meaningful crossexamination without adequate preparation. In the case of many indigent criminal defendants, the preparation of overworked public defenders or unmotivated court-appointed counsel may be weak or nonexistent. 1 Also, witness cross-examination is most effective when a witness is clearly wrong or lying, and other evidence, such as a prior
inconsistent statement, is available that proves this. The dramatic
contradiction or revelation of mistake or bias established through crossexamination occurs far less often in real life than cinema or television
depictions of the courtroom suggest. Moreover, lawyers can manipulate cross-examination to discredit a truthful witness 36 by confusing
the witness, by prejudicing the fact finder against him through disclosure of criminal convictions that may have little or no bearing on the
witness's veracity, 137 or by other methods. Even cross-examination
that discloses possible bias of a witness with a history of dishonesty-may be misleading if the witness on this occasion, despite such a
history, happens to be telling the truth.
133.

See Landsman, Reforming Adversary Procedure:A ProposalConcerning the Psychol-

ogy of Memory and the Testimony of Disinterested Witnesses, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 547, 555-56
(1984).
134. Note the following advice offered in a leading text on trial tactics about how to conduct
cross-examination:
d. Don't let the witness explain.
Open-ended questions are disastrous on cross-examinations.
e. Keep control over the witness.
Control comes in large part by asking precisely phrased leading questions that
never give the witness an opening to hurt you.
T. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 216 (2d ed. 1988).
135. See generally Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE
L.J. 1179 (1975); Carlin & Howard, Legal Representationand Class Justice, 12 UCLA L. REV.
381 (1965).
136. See, e.g., Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,52 U. CHI. L. REV.

823, 833-34 (1985).
137. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1); see also Mendez, California'sNew Law on Character
Evidence: Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent PsychologicalStudies, 31 UCLA L. REV.
1003, 1006-09 (1984).
138. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
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The assumption that face-to-face encounters are more honest because they chill any inclination to lie about another person also may
be inaccurate. Experience inside the courtroom indicates that many
people find it more difficult to convey honestly an opinion to a person's
face, than to say it behind the person's back. 139 For example, witnesses
who "sing" in organized crime cases may risk physical injury or
death, 40 and witnesses who "turn state's evidence" in exchange for
lenient treatment may be willing to speak against an accused in order
to please the authorities. In these cases, a witness's out-of-court statements might well be reliable, whereas the in-court statements may
be self-serving lies. Experience outside the courtroom likewise
suggests that face-to-face exchanges may be less frank and honest
than discussions outside the presence of the person being discussed.
For example, the law expressly acknowledges this when it maintains
the confidentiality of deliberations about the promotion and tenure of
faculty members so that colleagues will speak freely about a candidate's

merits. 141
Furthermore, if the constitutional preference for face-to-face encounters represents only the functional value of improving evidence
reliability, then we must ask why other, legitimate policy interests
should not be considered in the confrontation calculus. For example,
confrontation of the victim and defendant may be traumatic for the
victim in some instances, perhaps especially in cases of sexual assault
or battery. The right to cross-examine can offend other interests as
well, such as the interest in protecting the anonymity of juvenile
offenders.1 2 The confrontation requirement also may be inefficient.
139. Professor Michael Graham may disagree. He believes that "[p]eople are more careful
and sincere when they accuse someone face to face rather than when they are spreading a
rumor." Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging Issues in
Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions,40 U. MiAMI L. REV. 19, 74 (1985).
Although people may be more "careful" in face-to-face encounters, this does not necessarily

mean they are more sincere. The word "rumor" connotes baseless, unsubstantiated talk. Not
all talk behind a person's back, however, is "rumor." A child who alleges that a person has

sexually assaulted him or her may not be spreading a rumor. A co-conspirator who confesses
to details of a crime but later refuses to testify against a defendant may well have been more
sincere when talking behind the scenes than when confronted by the defendant. Unwillingness

to accuse someone face-to-face therefore on occasion may reflect fear or self interest rather than
sincerity.
140.

See, e.g., Witness Admits His Recantation Was a Lie, Gainesville Sun, Oct. 3, 1987,

at 7A, col. 1 (reporting that a mob hit man had falsely recanted his court testimony against a
Mafia boss because of death threats to his family).
141. See, e.g., Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyme College, 552 F.2d 579, 581 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 904 (1977) (noting the College's argument that confidentiality was essential 'to receive
honest and candid appraisals of the abilities of faculty members by their peers").
142. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974).
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Live testimony may be more time-consuming than other forms of
testimony, such as affidavits or depositions, and court appearances
may inconvenience witnesses who need to travel or miss work in order
to testify. A more significant cost of the confrontation requirement,
one that directly undermines the claim that the requirement enhances
reliability, is that it may operate to exclude probative evidence.
The confrontation guarantee cannot be explained solely by the claim
that face-to-face encounters may enhance the reliability of the witness's
testimony. It might be partially explained by a belief - rational or
irrational - that it might enhance the reliability of evidence against
the accused in some cases. Even when the evidence is less "reliable"
because the witness is afraid or otherwise unwilling to speak against
the accused, this lesser reliability benefits the defendant. But, this
interest in evidence reliability seems to be an insufficient basis for
the confrontation right to have been given separate constitutional
status. The due process clause may be read to assure reasonably
rational or accurate justice,143 and so is an adequate guarantee of "fair
evidence" in this sense. The second assumption, that face-to-face encounters promote an aspect of a "fair" proceeding that goes beyond
evidence reliability, therefore is a more compelling and complete explanation for the colonists' decision to give the right to confrontation
separate constitutional status.
But what do we mean by "fair" procedure, and what part should
confrontation play in assuring this goal? The Constitution suggests
that "fairness" means both rationality and respect for the participants.
The "bundle of rights" in the fifth and sixth amendments assures
procedure that promotes, at the least, five values. First, similarly
situated defendants should receive equal treatment. Second, adjudication should be nonarbitrary, and performed by an impartial decisionmaker. Third, the procedures should be predictable and intelligible to
those affected by them. Fourth, the procedure should entitle participants to discover the reasons for government's actions. Fifth, the
procedure should allow those affected to participate meaningfully, personally, and on equal footing with their adversary. Procedure therefore
not only should promote rationality through unbiased and accurate
decisionmaking, but also should show respect for persons by allowing
equal, active participation in decisions affecting their interest. Confrontation is a specific type of procedure that helps to promote both ends.
It promotes the instrumental goal of reducing the potential arbitrariness of the criminal proceeding, and it grants the defendant the intrinsic value of an opportunity to participate in the outcome.

143.

See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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The confrontation guarantee reflects a belief that criminal trials
of human beings should look human to do "justice,",- and should treat
the defendant - even an alleged child molester - as an equal, dignified participant in the proceedings against him. These qualities are
compromised when government prosecutors use affidavits, depositions,
videotaped testimony, one-way mirrors, or closed-circuit television testimony to prove their central accusations against the criminal defendant, no matter how "accurate" those accusations may be. Procedure
that is based on these forms of evidence no longer is an even contest
in which the defendant plays an active, equal, and dignified role.
If, for example, the accuser's testimony is given in a video presentation, then the testimony will gain whatever enhanced value that
"televisibn" affords a speaker. The defendant, of course, is not presented on video. Consequently, the jury is forced to evaluate the
credibility of two very different figures: the live, courtroom figure of
the defendant and the taped, out-of-court figure of the declarant. If
the medium of video enhances, even slightly, the power or persuasiveness of a "telegenic" speaker, then the defendant is placed at an
invisible and unmonitored disadvantage. The symmetry of the trial is
disturbed, because the defendant's status in the proceeding is reduced.
Likewise, if the court allows the bailiff to place a one-way mirror
or screen between defendant and accuser, the defendant becomes a
reduced, almost inhuman figure. The jurors may see the mirror or
screen as a court-authorized means of segregating the defendant from
the victim and, on a broader level, from the community. The defendant
is "tainted," or stigmatized by the presence of this shield. A person
who must be cordoned off, particularly from a small child, is not
someone a juror will be likely to believe, empathize with, or want to
protect. If the defendant appears to be too alien, too contagious, or
too dangerous to be confronted face-to-face, then the jury may be less
inclined to acquit that defendant.
Indeed, the screen may operate as a mask that shields the faces
of some of the courtroom actors. Although metaphors and other linguistic masks are pervasive in the law, 145 and costumes are worn by some
participants, these devices are not benign in all cases. In any event,
a screen or a one-way mirror is not a mere metaphorical device; it is
a tangible, literal barrier placed between accuser and accused. That

144. See Ball, The Play's the Thing: An UnscientificReflection on Courts Under the Rubric
of Theater, 28 STAN. L. REV. 81, 113 (1975).
145. Weyrauch, Law as Mask - Legal Ritual and Relevance, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 699,
713-22 (1978).
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physical barrier not only may change the behavior of the accuser, to
the possible prejudice of the defendant, it may alter the appearance
of the trial in unanticipated, negative ways. 146 The interaction of the
witness and the defendant in a courtroom setting is already an unnatural, ritualistic exchange. To add screens, television monitors, mirrors, or other mechanical devices may compromise further the "humanness" and equality of this exchange. The defendant cannot participate
equally in his or her own defense. Indeed, the defendant may need
to hire technicians or other media experts to assist in the cross-examination of these "video witnesses." The result may be a procedure that
is far removed from the original notion of human accuser and human
accused pitted in a face-to-face, live, and human exchange. The defendant will appear less a person than an object - and an unattractive
object at that - and may be treated in the impersonal way that one
treats an object.
Several noncourtroom illustrations offer intuitive support to the
claim that face-to-face encounters promote dignity, and not merely
reliability ends. Commonly-held notions about "fair play" and "decent
treatment" of others in social and business relationships indicate that
most people accord intrinsic value to face-to-face encounters. For
example, the indignity of receiving a "Dear John" letter lies in the
impersonal delivery of the bad news. The recipient may feel a strong
need to confront the sender not because he believes that her letter is
based on false assumptions or even that he can change her mind, but
because he needs to hear it face-to-face, to at least have an opportunity
to incline her heart toward him, perhaps because he wants her to see
- face-to-face - what her decision has meant to him.147 Recovery
from this personal, face-to-face encounter still may be painful, but the
disappointed party is less likely to feel he has been treated like a
stranger, or as a mere object in which his lover suddenly has lost
interest. His dignity and self-respect will be better preserved.
146. Some researchers are exploring the nature of face-to-face interaction, and are attempting to define the differences between such interaction and interaction through other channels,

such as telephone or writing. The significance of this research to this article is that we do not
yet know precisely what those differences are; we therefore may compromise qualities through

use of the alternative channels, without understanding what those qualities might be. See Comment, 43 Int'l J. Soc. Lang. 77 (1983) (authored by Regna Darnell) (commenting on a paper by
Madeleine Mathiot, which proposes a theory of face-to-face interaction).

147. This may explain the outrage of the victims of World War II concentration camps
when Klaus Barbie refused to make further appearances at his trial for crimes against humanity.
As one spokesperson for the Jews of Lyons stated, "We will not have the opportunity to see

Barbie face to face with his accusers, having to answer to the very people who will point their
fingers at him and say, 'You tortured me, you put me on the train for deportation."' Bernstein,
Barbie, Accusing Court, Leaves Trial, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1987, at AS, col.1.
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The United States military acknowledges this intrinsic value of
face-to-face encounters by its practice of delivering the news of the
death of a serviceman or woman in person. Likewise, in the business
world it is "indecent" to terminate an employee with a letter, instead
of in a face-to-face exchange. To use a letter demonstrates a lack of
respect for the affected person, and implies he or she is of low status.
People in our culture thus regard the delivery of significant bad
news through a letter, a telephone call, or other impersonal devices
as the choice of a messenger who is cowardly, or who lacks respect
for the equality, humanity, and dignity of the recipient. There is deep
and abiding emotional content to the expression, "Tell me to my face,"
which the reliability theory of confrontation ignores.'4 The acceptability of a legal decision to the participants and to the community may
hinge on whether this emotion is acknowledged.
The philosophy that likely undergirds our preference for face-toface confrontation is a belief that a person does, or should, have some
affinity for another person, simply because they are a human being.
If people viewed each other as total aliens, then an eye-to-eye encounter would be unlikely to evoke any tenderness, or to quicken the
instinct to be honest or fair or compassionate. The greater the distance,
physical, social or otherwise, between an accuser and accused, the
less discomforting it may be for the accuser to say harsh or untrue
things about the accused. 149 Physical proximity, in the form of a face-to-

148. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2800 (1988). Interaction between human beings
differs from interactions of humans with objects in ways that suggest that to deny physical
confrontation between defendant and accused is to treat the defendant more like an object than
a human being. Asch describes the quality of this difference as follows:
What then is distinctive about interactions between person and person? First,
unlike objects, persons alone respond to us. Objects do not greet us, they do not
blame or praise us, they do not love or hate us. They respond to our actions, not
to us; they are not aware of our presence. The mirror reflects but it does not see
us; only another person can be a true mirror for a human. For it is only persons

who can answer us with feeling and understanding, with irritation or admiration,
with assistance or competition ....
S. ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 141 (1952).
149. Studies show that distance between individuals makes it easier for a person to inflict

harm on another. Westen describes this research as follows:
A number of experimental studies have shown that instructing subjects to view a
victim in a detached way reduces empathic distress (Stotland, Sherman, and Shaver,
1971; Aderman, Brehm, and Rosenthal, 1974). Researchers interested in the social
psychology of war (e.g., Kelman and Lawrence, 1972) have discussed dehumanization of the enemy as a way of making killing psychologically tolerable, and Bandura
and Rosenthal (1966) observed that some individuals avoid empathic distress
through various cognitive mechanisms (i.e., internal "behaviors") such as thinking
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face encounter, may remind an accuser that his or her accusation is
directed at, and may cause pain to another human being. An accused
who is confronted by his or her accuser thus will gain whatever advantage this physical proximity may provide.
The accused also will gain the intrinsic benefit of the chance to
respond. If the witness lies, the accused may respond with a snort of
indignation, a glare, laughter, a cry of dismay, a curse, tears, or stony
silence. This opportunity to look the witness in the eye and to respond
may not change the witness's testimony. The opportunity to be seen
and heard by one's accusers nevertheless is of value - intrinsic value
- to the accused. This might be called the "shame on you" value of
confrontation. "Tell me to my face" therefore implies not only that
you must accuse me in person, but that you must remain to witness
my reaction.
This discussion should not be read to suggest that courtroom confrontation is not also instrumentally valuable. It may improve the
reliability of testimony against the accused on occasion, which undoubtedly is a critical goal in a criminal proceeding. But it is better described as a right instrumental to the achievement of a larger purpose:
the purpose of treating a defendant as an equal, active, and dignified
participant in the proceeding150 despite the potential cost to efficiency

about something else. Quite similar is the commonplace experience of avoiding
crying during a touching scene in a movie or play by staring at the exit sign or
some other neutral stimulus, or avoiding discomfort during an injection or minor
medical intervention by looking the other way or thinking of something pleasant.
D. WESTEN, SELF AND SOCIETY: NARCISSISM, COLLECTIVISM, AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF MORALS 35 (1985). The experience of observing the distress of another person has been
shown to trigger an empathic distress-response in the observer, which may lead to helping
behavior. See, e.g., Hoffman, The Development of Empathy, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING
BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL, PERSONALITY, AND DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES 45-47 (J. Rushton

& R. Sorrentino eds. 1981).
150. Cf. Pincoffs, supranote 126, at 172, 178-79. Pincoffs argues that the procedural values
of revelation and participation rest on "recognizable and solid moral ground." Id. at 172. He
locates the root of his moral ground in the second formulation of the Kantian imperative that
we never treat anyone, including ourselves, as a mere means. Id. at 176. He elaborates as
follows, in language that is relevant to this discussion of confrontation clause values:
Participation may be instrumentally valuable, but instrumental to the achievement
of a moral purpose that is itself impossible to describe in instrumental terms, the
purpose of treating a man not as a mere means but as an end in himself. This is
not to say that there is not intrinsic value in participation. I would prefer to say
that there may be, but that participation turns on its relation to a moral end..
. .We might say that participation is an instrument by which the valuation of
persons as ends in themselves is expressed. It is as if the Kantian principle were
determinable in any number of ways, but participation is one of the ways in which
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and outcome accuracy. Procedure that respects the individual, in turn,
may improve the appearance of the ultimate outcome to the commu-

nity.1r,
A.

Developing the Dignity Value Premise

The acceptability of this "fairness" or "dignity" interpretation of
confrontation probably will lie less in whether it accurately identifies
the whole value of confrontation than in whether it can solve practical

it may become determinate. It does not follow that mere participation is of value
(though it may have value), but rather follows that participation is morally valuable
to the degree that it makes determinate the moral principle that we should never
treat a man as a mere means.
Id. at 178-79. As Pincoffs says, procedure should be decent. He points out that "[diecency
requires that men who have a great deal to lose from an official decision be given an opportunity
to contest it." Id. at 180. But, as he further notes, this is not a mere matter of courtesy. "It
is, rather, the decency that prevails when a community is so governed that no man need fear
that he will be treated as a mere means." Id. at 181.
The point of this Article is to demonstrate that the confrontation clause is one element of
this "decency," and that it is designed to promote ends beyond the commonly-cited goal of
enhancing evidence reliability. To that extent, I disagree with Grey who argues that the rules
of fair procedure in criminal trials are designed solely to prevent mistaken convictions of innocent
defendants. Grey, ProceduralFairnessandSubstantive Rights, in DuE PROCESS NOMOS XVIII
182, 184 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977).
151. See L. TRIBE, supra note 127, at 13; Scanlon, supra note 126, at 94 ("requirement
of due process is one of the conditions of the moral acceptability of those institutions that give
some people power to control or intervene in the rights of others"); Saphire, Specifying Due
Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to ProceduralProtection, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 111, 124 (1978) ("[E]ven when outcomes of decisions are viewed as unfair or unjust, the
decisions may be accepted as legitimate if the processes through which they are reached respond
to basic principles of self-respect and autonomy.").
Professor Ball has compared courtroom procedures to theater, and concludes that 'the action
of the courtroom, as a type of theater, is an image of the manner in which citizens are to have
parts of importance and dignity, to be taken seriously and with ceremonious, protective deference, and to have their rights and duties fairly recognized." Ball, supra note 144, at 113. He
claims that live performances are an important aspect of the effectiveness of judicial procedure,
id. at 115, a claim that cautions against adoption of alternatives to a live performance despite
their lower cost or other benefit to the prosecution. The "humanizing dimension" of judicial
theater may be essential to the court's capacity for justice. Id.
The right of confrontation also may increase the defendant's perceived control over the
procedure, which may affect his or her confidence in the outcome. Psychological studies indicate
that the ability to exercise some control over a procedure can improve the participant's confidence
about the outcome - even in circumstances to which only luck or chance is relevant. For
example, subjects who were given a chance to choose their own lottery ticket from several were
more confident in their chances of winning than participants who simply were handed a ticket.
See R. NISBETT & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF
SOCIAL JUDGMENT 135-36 (1980).
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problems of defining the right of confrontation and when it is excused.
That is, can we derive usable standards from a claim that the confrontation guarantee rests on a principle of human dignity? The Court's
functional approach has been criticized because it asks unanswerable,
and possibly irrelevant, questions such as whether a co-conspirator's
statement in furtherance of a conspiracy is "reliable." The dignity
approach may ask the relevant question, that is, when does the use
of hearsay by the prosecution encroach unduly on individual dignity,
but is this question likewise unanswerable?
I conclude that this question is not unanswerable, and that it is a
less difficult one than the questions raised by other provisions of the
Constitution that preserve fundamental rights of the accused. Unlike
the general and open-ended due process clause, for example, the confrontation clause speaks directly to the specific type of procedure that
the colonists envisioned, and when it would be triggered. The confrontation guarantee states that the criminaldefendant shall be confronted
by his or her accusers. We therefore need not ask whether a "property
right" is at stake, as we must in a procedural due process analysis.
We also are told, in more certain terms than the due process clause
provides, what process is "due." As has been shown above, the language of the clause offers a preliminary definition of the guarantee:
it is the right to confront physically and to question those persons
who accuse the defendant of a crime, and whose focused accusations
are relied on by the prosecution in a criminal proceeding. We still
must decide, however, what kinds of accusations fall within the guarantee. It is at this point that our theory about the clause becomes
relevant. Again, the appropriate question under the individual dignity
approach is this: when will admission of an out-of-court statement
deny the defendant his or her individual dignity?
First, the dignity theory implies that the clause should be construed
most liberally when the risk to the defendant's individual liberty is
greatest. Indeed, the confrontation guarantee applies only to criminal
proceedings and not to civil proceedings, because the threat to the
individual's liberty - his or her status as an equal, dignified, and free
person - is perceived to be greatest when the possible outcome is
classification of the person as a criminal. 152 It follows that the threat
to individual liberty is likewise more significant - and hence of greater
constitutional concern - when the hearsay in question is central to
the government's charge against the accused. This suggests that wit-

152. See Mashaw, Dignity Process:A PoliticalPsychology of Liberal Democratic Citizenship, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 433 (1987).
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nesses who make "devastating" or crucial accusations should confront
the accused. Therefore, Lord Cobham's out-of-court accusation against
Sir Walter Raleigh excites confrontation clause concern, whereas the
neighbor who claims she saw a bearded man rush out of the liquor
store does not. That is, the "devastating" nature of the out-of-court
statement should play a role in deciding whether the hearsay poses
a sixth amendment problem. Hearsay on a collateral matter does not
assume constitutional proportion.
The dignity theory, as I have defined it, further implies that the
confrontation guarantee, like all procedure, should protect against the
threat of official arbitrariness. An unavailable-first requirement therefore does make sense - even if the evidence "would come in anyway"
because it safeguards against arbitrary prosecutorial conduct. It
requires the government to account for the absence of the declarant
of a central accusation against the defendant, and allays fears that
the reason for the witness's absence is arbitrariness or discrimination
against the accused. It also means that the government must take all
reasonable steps to procure the witness's presence and thereby preserve both the intrinsic and functional values of confrontation.
The dignity theory also suggests that the individual is entitled to
reasonably predictable procedures. Therefore, traditional methods of
handling hearsay are relevant under the individual dignity model but
only to the extent that past practice affects the individual's procedure
expectations, and his or her ability to anticipate what procedures the
court will follow. Tradition may determine what a given culture perceives as fair treatment of the individual. An individual within that
culture likely will share this perception and expect to be treated accordingly. Indeed, the individual may feel deprived of equal status if
this expectation is not realized.
Finally, "decent procedure" entitles the individual to an explanation
and justification of official acts.'5 The right to confront one's accusers
is one aspect of a procedure that offers such reasons, or at least
provides the accused with the opportunity to explore the basis of
accusations through cross-examination. It takes seriously the defendant's objections to such official acts and places them "on a par with
the claims of authority."'154 Also, as Justice Marshall has stated, confl'ontation helps to assure an "open and even contest."'5 5 Thus, only
hearsay statements that compromise the appearance of an open and
equal contest are of constitutional concern.

153.
154.
155.

See Scanlon, supra note 126, at 93.
Id.
See Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2670 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The quintessential confrontation violation would arise if the govern-

ment relied on anonymous informers as the key evidence in the prosecution of a defendant. Trials based on anonymous accusations reduce
the defendant to the role of just another witness - and a disadvantaged one - in his or her own trial, rather than someone entitled to
be present throughout the whole proceeding and to participate fully
in the trial. In fact, absent disclosure of the identity of the accusers
and an opportunity to confront and challenge them, the proceeding no

longer is an adversarial one.15 6 A likely consequence will be that American observers, who are enculturated to expect and to respect an
adversary model, will doubt the fairness of the proceeding. Moreover,
any criminal process, whether adversarial or not, that bases convictions on the testimony of anonymous "snitches" will make people fear
that their government acts arbitrarily, does not treat all citizens
equally, and may deny them a fair opportunity to defend themselves
against charges of wrongdoing. 57 This risk of arbitrariness would be

156. Provocative work by Thibaut and his collaborators suggests that Americans perceive
an adversary system of decisionmaking as more just than an inquisitorial one. See Thibaut,
Walker, LaTour & Houlden, ProceduralJustice as Fairness, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1287-88
(1974). The adversary system, they observe, 'qntroduces a systematic evidentiary bias in favor
of the party disadvantaged by the discovered facts," [e.g. the defendant in a criminal case). Id.
at 1289. It also tends to assure both parties equal access to information and to control of the
proceeding. An implication of their study is that these two features are important aspects of
"fairness" in procedure. Government reliance on accusations of anonymous or absent accusers
would compromise both features, as it would disadvantage the accused and would afford the
government superior access to information.
In another work, Thibaut and Walker conclude that -affording participants control over the
proceeding - an adversary system characteristic - improves their sense of justice, even though
greater decisionmaker control - an inquisitorial system characteristic - may enhance the
accuracy of the outcome. See Thibaut & Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. REV.
541, 556-57, 565-66 (1978). "Truth" and "justice" therefore are not synonymous. Moreover, they
conclude, discovery of truth is not the main objective of the legal process. Id. at 556. If they
are correct, then the Court's insistence that the primary goal of the confrontation guarantee is
to enhance evidence reliability, i.e., 'truth," rather than to enhance the defendant's opportunity
for participation and control of the proceeding, i.e., "justice," misses the true goal of criminal
procedure.
157. See, e.g., F. KAFKA, THE TRIAL 3 (21st printing 1978). This is the theme of THE
TRIAL. In Kafka's haunting novel, "the law" is the exercise of government power to support
arbitrary decisions. The well-known first sentence of the book reads: "Someone must have
traduced Josef K., for without having done anything wrong he was arrested one
morning." Id. There is no stated charge, no visible accuser, no opportunity to be heard, and
no chance to defend. Josef K. is accused, condemned, and executed by faceless beings for
unstated reasons.
THE TRIAL remains a deeply disturbing book because Kafka's scenario seems possible and
contemporary. Fear that innocent citizens might meet a fate like that of Josef K. probably
underlies the "bundle of rights" afforded criminal defendants through the fifth and sixth amendments.
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greatest with political crimes, such as treason or conspiracy against
the government. In these cases, the government would have a clear
motive to accuse wrongly and convict its political enemy, and the only
evidence of the alleged crime may be the anonymous accuser's words.
If a hearsay declarant is not available because of death, serious
illness, location beyond the subpoena power of the court, or location
unknown despite a diligent search, and if the declarant's identity and
the reasons for his or her absence are made known to the fact finders,
then the issue becomes whether the confrontation guarantee is satisfied
by this showing of unavailability. Assume, for example, that Lord
Cobham had died. Should the government then have been permitted
to introduce his out-of-court statement against Sir Walter Raleigh?
The answer suggested by the individual dignity approach is that
the confrontation clause does not require exclusion of a genuinely
unavailable declarant's hearsay. The reason is that all concerned (the
defendant, the jury, and the courtroom observers) can be told why
the declarant is not present for examination. If the defendant believes
that the government has fabricated this out-of-court testimony, he or
she must question the police officer who offers the testimony, or otherwise attempt to establish that the statement was not made by the
declarant. If the defendant believes that the declarant made the statement, but is a liar, then the defendant must attempt to discredit the
declarant by introducing evidence about his or her credibility, perception, or motive to lie. This may be a formidable task, of course.'i
Doubts about the reliability of the testimony and about whether defendants should be convicted on the basis of this type of uncross-examined
testimony remain a serious concern. But these doubts are due process
concerns, not confrontation clause concerns. 159 The due process problem

158. The government may have a natural advantage in a criminal case, despite the "beyond
a reasonable doubt" standard of proof. Some studies indicate that 60% of prospective jurors do
not accept the principle that a defendant is presumed innocent. See, e.g., NATIONAL JURY
PROJECT & NATIONAL LAWYERS' GUILD, THE JURY SYSTEM: NEW METHODS FOR REDUCING PREJUDICE 2 (1975).

159. See Note, Confrontationand the HearsayRule, 75 YALE L.J. 1434 (1966). If evidence
reliability were the touchstone to the confrontation guarantee, then one might ask why the
colonists restricted it to criminal cases. Presumably, reliability of evidence also is a significant
concern in civil cases. The restriction to criminal cases suggests that the guarantee was based
on a concern about arbitrary assertion of government authority in cases in which the individual
is pitted directly against the government and when the potential loss to the individual is most
grave.
Also, if the confrontation clause were only concerned with reliability, it would be redundant,
insofar as the due process clause should protect against convictions based on unreliable testimony.
See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 184 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that
there should be a distinction between the due process right of a reliable and trustworthy
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is whether the government should be able to satisfy its "beyond a

reasonable doubt" burden with this out-of-court accusation alone. This
burden of proof problem is not solved by reference to the confrontation
guarantee. As stated earlier, the confrontation clause by itself does

not assure fair trials or trials based solely on dependable evidence. 16
The confrontation guarantee simply requires that people who accuse a criminal defendant must confront the defendant. Because the
confrontation guarantee is restricted to human witnesses, 161 it should
take into account that humans die, move, hide, become afraid, forget, 162
refuse to cooperate, or act in other ways that make it impossible for
the government to secure their presence at trial or assure that if
present, they will respond to defendant's questions on cross-examination. If "confrontation" connotes human, face-to-face encounters, as is
suggested herein, then it also must anticipate that these encounters
are not always feasible.
Of course, human beings also lie, misperceive, misstate, or otherwise mischaracterize facts, so that reliance on their central accusations
without the opportunity for face-to-face confrontation can produce serious errors. These concerns about an arbitrary result are important
and may assume constitutional proportions;' 3 but the appropriate re-

conviction and the confrontation right); cf. Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial
Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1372-75 (1985) (arguing that
the confrontation clause and the rule against hearsay improve the stability of judgments by
preventing jurors from relying on statements of declarants who later recant; in-court testimony
is harder to recant, and any later contradictory statement is less likely to be believed).
160. See supra text accompanying note 32.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
162. See United States v. Owens, 108 S. Ct. 838 (1988) (approving admission of prior
identification when declarant had no present recollection of the identification).
163. The potential unfairness would be greatest if the absent declarant were the only
witness against the accused, and the alleged crime were grave. In such a case, an acquittal
might be appropriate. This is an ancient concept, as the following Biblical passages show: "If
any one kills a person, the murderer shall be put to death on the evidence of witnesses; but
no person shall be put to death on the testimony of one witness." Numbers 35:30; "On the
evidence of two witnesses or of three witnesses he that is to die shall be put to death; a person
shall not be put to death on the evidence of one witness." Deuteronomy 17:6.
These ancient passages suggest that people have long believed that the testimony of one
person not be used as the sole basis for conviction in cases in which the potential penalty is
grave - even if that one person is available for confrontation.
Sir William Holdsworth observed that during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, English law required evidence of two witnesses for a conviction of some offenses. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 205-06 (1938). This rule of "testis unus testis nullus," however,
had a relatively small effect on modern English law. The result was an emphasis on the proper
weight of the evidence rather than the number of witnesses who swore to a fact. Id. at 209-11.
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sponse to these concerns is the due process clause. The dignity value
of the confrontation guarantee, as it has been defined herein, is preserved when the government exhausts all feasible alternatives to the
use of out-of-court accusations, and explains to the court why the
accuser is not available for cross-examination by the accused.
If the declarant does appear, then the court must allow the defendant to be present during the witness's examination and must permit
the defendant to question and challenge the witness in a face-to-face
encounter. Ica The witness may be uncooperative or may have no memory of the prior statement. Nevertheless, according to the theory
developed herein, this would not be a denial of the right to confrontation.
B.

Applications of the Dignity Value Theory

Returning to the Court's recent confrontation cases, we therefore
find that the dignity theory offers both more and less protection for
criminal defendants than the reliability theory. First, it would render
obsolete the reliability step of the Roberts test, including the presumption that firmly-rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule are "reliable."
Case law that attempts to define the adequacy of various prior opportunities for cross-examination likewise would become a footnote in
confrontation clause history. Evaluations of the relative adequacy of
the defendant's "opportunity" for cross-examination of testimony at a
preliminary hearing, a grand jury proceeding, or at trial when the
witness is uncooperative, forgetful, or hostile, no longer would be
necessary. Similarly, courts would not need to compare categories of
hearsay on the basis of their purported "independent evidentiary significance," as hnadi now requires them to do. Therefore, the dignity
theory provides less confrontation clause protection to defendants, to
the extent that an unavailable declarant's statement would be admissible regardless of its apparent or actual "reliability."
When, however, a declarant is "available," the government must
produce him or her. Thus, Inadi would be rejected to the extent that
it abandons the "unavailable-first" requirement of Roberts. The confr'ontation decisions that define "unavailability" would remain impor-

One American remnant of this history may be found in Article III section 3 of the Constitution,
which provides that "No person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the testimony of two

witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
164. This approach is consistent with that advocated by Justice Harlan in California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 186-87 (1970). See also Younger, Confrontation and Hearsay: A Look
Backward, A Peek Forward, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 32, 41-42 (1973); Note, Confrontation and
the Hearsay Rule 75 YALE L.J. 1434 (1966).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1988

51

Florida Law
Review, Vol.
Iss. 5 [1988], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
LAW40,
REVIEW

[Vol. 40

tant precedent, though that term may require closer scrutiny than it
has received in the past. The Federal Rules of Evidence offer workable
examples of unavailability, 16 which may be an appropriate framework
for constitutional standards. The dignity approach also would require
courts to define a "central accusation" against a defendant. One
guideline for these determinations would be whether the defendant
reasonably would be expected to cross-examine the witness about the
statement. 1 In addition, the statement must be a "focused" accusation
before the confrontation clause will apply. Thus, for example, a laboratory drug analysis report offered against a defendant in a drug case
presents no confrontation clause problem under the proposed theory.
This statement may be "central" or "devastating," but it is not the
16 7
type of focused accusation that excites sixth amendment concern.
In contrast, an out-of-court statement by a declarant that names the
defendant as a drug supplier would fall within the confrontation clause.
Statements that currently are admissible regardless of the declarant's availability no longer would be admissible in a criminal proceeding
unless the government produced the declarant or accounted for his or
her absence. If, for example, the victim of an assault made an "excited
utterance" to a police officer in which she identified the defendant as
her assailant, the out-of-court statement would not be admissible
against the defendant unless the victim were unavailable. Her statement would be a clear example of a "central" accusation, and no necessity factor would support its admission in lieu of her appearance in

165. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a), which defines unavailability as including situations in which
the declarant:
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying
concerning the subject matter of his statement; or (2) persists in refusing to testify
concerning the subject matter of his statement despite an order of the court to do
so; or (3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then

existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or (5) is absent from the hearing
and the proponent of his statement has been unable to procure his attendance.
Id.

166. See, e.g., Unified Theory, supra note 3, at 617-18.
167. This means that lower court cases, such as United States v. Houser, 746 F.2d 55
(D.C. Cir. 1984), might be decided differently. In Houser, the Court of Appeals suggested that
a "business record" -

a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) tracer form offered

to show the movement of a firearm in or connection with interstate commerce - posed a
confrontation problem. Id. at 62. Movement in interstate commerce was a statutory element of
the offense with which the defendant was charged. Id. at 56. The tracer form was prepared by
an unidentified BATF clerk. An agent of the BATF did appear at the trial who described the
tracing procedure, as part of the foundation for the record. Id. at 57.
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court. If she did appear but failed to respond to questions about the
statement, whether due to fear, hostility, loss of memory, or any
other reason, her prior out-of-court statement would be admissible
because the government would have accounted for its failure to use
her live, face-to-face testimony.
Another example is use of videotaped or closed-circuit testimony
of a child witness in sexual assault cases, which would not be admissible
unless the child were shown to be unavailable for in-court examination.
First, the child would have to appear before the defendant. If the
child refused to speak, then the government could introduce the prior,
out-of-court statement of the child against the accused.
This last suggestion may appear insensitive to the potential trauma
that a child witness may suffer in making even such a limited court

appearance. 1s One may argue that the dignity of the defendant should
not trump the dignity of the victim.169 The response, which will be

168. Studies indicate that not all child victims suffer trauma in testifying, some find the
experience cathartic and vindicating. See. e.g., Terr, The Child Psychiatrist and the Child
Witness: Traveling Companions by Necessity, If Not by Design, 25 J. Am. AcAD. OF CHILD
PSYCHIATRY 462, 469 (1986); Yates, Should Young Children Testify in Cases of Seual Abuse?.
144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 476, 478 (1987). Moreover, the stress experience is not caused exclusively by testifying in court. The repeated questioning by authorities and the effect on the
family of legal prosecution in incest cases can cause stress as well. See Claman, Harris, Bernstein
& Lovitt, The Adolescent as a Witness in a Case of Incest: Assessment and Outcome, 25 J.
AM. ACAD. OF CHILD PSYCHIATRY 457, 458 (1986); Melton, Psycholegal Issues in Child

Victims' InteractionWith the Legal System, 5 VICTIMOLOGY 274, 275-76 (1980).
169. As Justice Cardozo once wrote, "[J]ustice, though due to the accused, is due to the
accuser also." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934); see also Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74 (1970); Hagins v. Warden, 715 F.2d 1050, 1058-59 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1071 (1984). To say that the criminal justice system should be sensitive to the "rights" of
victims, however, does not mean that the defendant's right to be confronted with adverse
witnesses must be limited or eliminated to accommodate these rights. The insensitive treatment
of adult rape victims by law enforcement personnel and by society has concerned many writers,
including this author. See Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility and Rape: The Rape
Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implication for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN.
L. REV. 395 (1985). Appropriate responses to this problem, however, need not defeat the
defendant's right to a fair trial, as we have known it. Certainly, it would be less traumatic for
an adult rape victim to give her testimony through videotaped or closed-circuit television testimony. If we only offer this protection to child witnesses, then we need to defend that distinction.
It is difficult to imagine how that argument could be made without claiming that the trauma
of a child is somehow greater, or more important than the trauma of an adult. Even if such
comparisons among victims were made, however, they likely only would be a matter of the
degree of trauma suffered.
Another point is that the advent of closed-circuit or videotaped testimony for child victims
of sexual assault may have been prompted less by a concern that the re-telling will traumatize
the child than by the concern that the child will not re-tell the story when confronted with the
adult abuser. A desire to secure convictions in child abuse cases thus may be as much of an
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unsatisfactory to some people, is that the victim's difficulty in making
a face-to-face accusation is worthy of our attention, but it should not
defeat the defendant's constitutional right. If this type of "balancing"
of extrinsic interests intrudes into confrontation analysis, then the

clause may be sapped of its fundamental vitality. Moreover, there is
an obvious danger in redefining constitutional rights of the accused
to accommodate the sensitivities and characteristics of certain classes
of victims. If "confrontation" is redefined in child abuse cases, then
it may be redefined in other categories of cases as well, depending
on a judge's or legislature's inclination to weigh the victim's trauma
in those cases more heavily than the trauma of victims in other cases.
One-way mirrors may appear not only in child abuse cases, but also
in adult rape cases, attempted murder cases, kidnapping cases, and

any other cases in which the victim has suffered physical and
psychological trauma that may be aggravated by facing the defendant.
The government could offer other equally compelling reasons for "excusing" confrontation, such as fear for the safety of witnesses who
testify against defendants in drug cases, or in trials of terrorists or
members of other violent organizations.
One may argue that my proposed alternative requires the prosecu-

tion to engage in a futile and meaningless exercise by compelling it
to produce witnesses who it knows will not testify. I believe, however,

that the potential "futility" of this ritual does not render it meaningless.
The attempt to offer live testimony offers visible and concrete proof
that the government has made every reasonable effort to preserve
the defendant's opportunity for a face-to-face confrontation. 170 The deexplanation for the development of alternatives to in-court testimony by the children as is any
demonstrated psychological trauma to the child caused by courtroom testimony.
Other problems noted by commentators are that interrogation may be repeated several times
in the prosecution process, and that the interviewers may not be sensitive to the child's level
of understanding. See, e.g., Cares, supra note 7, at 46-47; Comment, Child Sexual Abuse in
California: Legislative and Judicial Responses, 15 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 437, 442-43;
Comment, Criminal Procedure:Closed-CircuitTestimony of Child Victims, 40 OKLA. L. REV.
69, 72-73 (1987). These important problems of how criminal procedure should treat victims,
however, are not solved or eased by denying the defendant the opportunity to confront the
child at the hearing that will determine his or her guilt. Education of law enforcement personnel
about child development and about sexual abuse, judicial regulation of the tone, content, and
extent of child-victim interviews, modification of direct and cross-examination of the children,
and restricted access to court proceedings may be more appropriate responses to these concerns.
See generally Jones, Judicial Questioning of Children in Custody and Visitation Proceedings,
18 FAm. L.Q. 43 (1984).
170. Even rituals with less obvious benefits have a proper role in the law. As Smith,
McWilliams and Bloomfield have observed:
[A]ll social rituals and some in particular (like religious rites) have a special shape
and drama, but in few areas of life is this so obvious and important as in the law.
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fendant can look the noncomplying accusers in the eye and ask why
they remain silent now, though they were willing to make accusations
before. Therefore, the defendant will receive as much of an opportunity
for "confrontation" as the limits of human behavior allow. No one neither the defendant nor the community observers - reasonably can
expect more. The ultimate outcome may be "wrong" on occasion, but
it will not be "unfair" in the narrow, but important, sense that the
confrontation clause intends.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The confrontation clause guarantee represents one aspect of a criminal procedure that preserves the dignity of the defendant. The clause
anticipates the opportunity for a particular type of interaction between
the accused and his or her human accusers. The history, wording, and
purpose of the sixth amendment suggest that the value of the confrontation clause is preserved when the defendant and accuser are brought
face-to-face, in open court, and the defendant is allowed to crossexamine the accuser. However, when a face-to-face encounter is impossible, due to death of the accuser or other circumstances not attributable to the government, then the out-of-court accusation nevertheless
can be admitted without offending the individual dignity value of the
confrontation guarantee. The prosecution must make every reasonable
attempt to secure the presence of the witnesses against the accused.
In no event may it rely on out-of-court accusations by anonymous
witnesses, or by witnesses who could have been brought before the
tribunal.
The Court's reliability theory of the confrontation guarantee is
both overbroad and underbroad. Applied strictly, it probably permits
videotaped testimony of witnesses, and out-of-court statements of
available co-conspirators, but disallows "unreliable" testimony of de-

Society wants trials to follow their special structure not only for practical reasons
of hearing cases but also because that structure is satisfying in some profound
way. This suggests that the standards of legal order and aesthetic order are related,
and that the individual's and the community's conception of justice is based not
only on principles but also on a sense of what is the most emotionally and intellec-

tually pleasing relation of actions.
C. SMITH, J. MCWILLIAMS & M. BLOOMFIELD, LAW AND AMERICAN LITERATURE 15 (1983).
This passage suggests an essentially irrational basis for the confrontation guarantee: it contributes to an "emotionally and pleasing relation of actions." The ritual of bringing the accuser and

accused brow-to-brow may satisfy us for reasons we cannot articulate or justify. Nor may we
need to, for as long as that ritual continues to "please" us it will serve a valid purpose.
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clarants who are not available for questioning. This article argues that
these results do not comport with common expectations about fair
criminal proceedings.
The shortcomings of the Court's theory are that the theory does
not adequately explain the Court's own holdings, and it fails to consider
the intrinsic value of confrontation. The proposed individual dignity
theory responds to the theoretical deficiencies in the Court's confrontation analysis, and fairly accommodates both the rights of the defendant and the practicalities of routine litigation. It also corresponds
with enduring American cultural assumptions about "fairness" in criminal procedure.171 Although these cultural assumptions may be inefficient, the law nevertheless should respect them. Legal procedures
that shunt our higher expectations about individual dignity in favor
of short-term, efficiency-based claims will compromise the humanity
of the participants, as well as the long-term acceptability of legal
results.

171. One may argue that if other cultures do not place similar value on face-to-face confrontations, then the encounter is not a matter of fundamental human dignity. I would respond with
this quote from Cahn: "Concepts may be real without being universal." E. CAHN, THE SENSE
OF INJUSTICE 23 (1949).
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